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REGULATORY CONTRARIANS*
BRETT MCDONNELL & DANIEL SCHWARCZ**
This Article explores the role that “regulatory contrarians” can play in
promoting more adaptive financial regulation. Such contrarians have
several distinguishing features. First, they possess persuasive authority by
virtue of their position, access to media and officials, or speaking
engagements and reports. Second, they are affiliated with, and enjoy
privileged access to, a regulatory entity but are nonetheless independent,
as reflected in their budget, staffing, and/or priorities. Finally, they are
tasked with studying the regulatory process, policy positions, and the
regulated market and in some way reporting on deficiencies and potential
improvements. The Article argues that regulatory contrarians can modestly
limit the risk that regulators will fail to adapt to newly emerging and ever-
shifting financial risks, by either failing to enact new rules or failing to
modify or repeal old rules. Despite this potential, the Article argues that, in
the domain of financial regulation, contrarians are used only in a small
subset of the instances where they can provide value. Currently, financial
regulatory contrarians fit into four basic categories: (1) Ombudsman
Contrarians, (2) Consumer Representative Contrarians, (3) Investigative
Contrarians, and (4) Research Contrarians. Whereas the first two types of
contrarians are limited in their subject area to consumer protection and
services, the latter two types of contrarians are limited in their
methodological scope. Finally, the Article argues that the Dodd-Frank Act
holds the potential to improve financial regulation by transcending
historical limitations embedded in the traditional categories of financial
regulatory contrarians.
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Multiple, interacting forces precipitated the global financial crisis of
2008. But the failure of regulators to curb systemic risk in the shadow
banking sector or to limit consumer abuses in mortgage markets are among
the most troubling contributors to the crisis.1 Financial regulators enjoyed
both substantial statutory authority to address these problems and
meaningful warnings from the academic community of the need to do so.2
1. For an excellent overview of the role of these two factors in the financial crisis, see
generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, SHADOW BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010)
[hereinafter SHADOW BANKING], available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford .edu/cdn_media/fcic-
reports/2010-0505-Shadow-Banking.pdf; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE MORTGAGE CRISIS
(2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/ cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0407-PSR_-
_The_Mortgage_Crisis.pdf.
2. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Pat A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (warning of the need to more
effectively regulate the mortgage market); Gary Gorton, Bank Regulation When “Banks” and
“Banking” Are Not the Same, 10 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 106 (1994) (explaining the need for
better regulation of nonbank entities that compete with banks for greater market share); Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215
(providing a pre-crisis warning of the need to better regulate large financial conglomerates). One
of the more prominent law review articles in recent times argued that federal banking agencies
had the authority to protect consumers from “unsafe” credit but did not have the motivation to do
so because they were primarily motivated by protecting the safety and soundness of banks. See,
e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 86–95
(2008). Regulatory authority prior to financial reform with respect to the shadow banking system
is harder to describe, largely because the shadow banking system specifically evolved to evade
regulatory restrictions on banking. See SHADOW BANKING, supra note 1, at 10–14. But it was
hardly the case that regulators possessed no authority to limit the risks of shadow banking. For
instance, some have argued that the SEC’s failure to regulate money market accounts
appropriately by requiring mark-to-market accounting contributed to the financial crisis. See
William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155, 1181–
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These causes of the crisis were consequently not merely a product of an
inadequate statutory regime, but just as much (if not more) a product of the
failure of regulators to accomplish their prescribed goals.3
Now that the riskiness of shadow banking and mortgage abuses have
become clear, it is hardly surprising that reform efforts have sought to more
effectively regulate these activities. But financial markets are constantly
changing and generating new and unanticipated risks, ensuring that the next
financial crisis will be different than the previous one. Indeed, much
financial innovation is specifically driven by the inevitable quest of the
financial sector to avoid regulation and the compliance costs that come
along with it.4 In that sense, it is not merely a possibility—but a near
certainty—that new financial risks will emerge that cannot be specifically
targeted in legislation. For that reason, law will only have a fighting chance
to defer and moderate the next financial crisis if regulators are entrusted
with broad authority to limit newly emerging, but previously unanticipated,
risks.
The financial crisis of 2008 thus leaves us with apparently conflicting
lessons. On one hand, regulators failed to use authority they clearly
possessed to limit identified risks, but on the other hand law has no choice
but to rely on such regulators to anticipate and counteract newly emerging
financial risks. This diagnosis suggests deep limits in the capacity of law
and regulation to prevent future financial crises. At the same time, though,
it suggests that a core challenge facing financial regulation is to devise
mechanisms that can mitigate the risk that regulators will not evolve as fast
as the marketplaces they are regulating. Making matters yet more
complicated, the regulatory implications of an evolving marketplace are not
unidirectional. Whereas some forms of market evolution demand new
regulations or enforcement strategies, other forms of market evolution
90 (arguing that the SEC’s revisions to its regulations of money market funds fail to solve, and
even exacerbate, this underlying problem). Another failure of financial regulators to exercise their
regulatory authority pre-crisis involved the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity Program,
which supervised investment banks on a consolidated basis. The SEC inspector general
recognized serious problems in the operation of this program. See SEC INSPECTOR GEN., SEC’S
OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES 5 (2008), available at http://www.sec-
oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-b.pdf.
3. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT,
at xvii (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf (“We conclude that the financial crisis was avoidable” and was
“the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or computer models gone
haywire.”); id. at xviii (“Yet we do not accept the view that regulators lacked the power to protect
the financial system. They had ample power in many arenas and they chose not to use it.”).
4. See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 321 (1999).
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necessitate regulatory adaptation in the opposite direction, counseling the
repeal or decreased enforcement of regulations that have gone too far or
become outdated.
Various important suggestions for overcoming agency inaction in the
face of financial market change have already begun to emerge. The most
notable of these, which is incorporated in the Dodd-Frank Act, proposed
creating an independent agency dedicated to consumer protection in the
arena of credit.5 Other proposals for promoting agency responsiveness to
change include limiting the capacity of financial institutions to choose their
regulators,6 promoting competition among multiple enforcers of
regulation,7 and improving the training and resources of financial
regulators.8
This Article describes an additional approach to taming the risk that
regulators will fail to invoke their authority to address newly emerging
financial risks or more generally to modify existing regulatory schemes
when modification is warranted. In particular, it suggests charging an entity
that is affiliated with, but independent of, a financial regulator with the task
of monitoring that regulator and the regulated marketplace and publicly
suggesting new initiatives or potential structural or personnel changes.
Although we are the first to label such entities “regulatory contrarians,”
they are not uncommon in the regulatory state. Various ombudsmen have
evolved to take on the role of a regulatory contrarian, such as the Taxpayer
Advocate Service of the Internal Revenue Service.9 Some regulators run
5. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 98–100 (proposing the creation of a new
consumer agency that would have broad rulemaking and enforcement authority to regulate
consumer financial products).
6. See, e.g., Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The Office of
Thrift Supervision and the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777, 1779–80 (2011); Patricia A.
McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory
Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 517–23 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or
Selling Insurance Regulation: Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1707, 1727–28 (2009).
7. See Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice Enforcement in Financial
Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279, 306–09 (2009); Amanda M. Rose, The
Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2173, 2200–29 (2010) (discussing the use of multiple enforcers to combat underdeterrence of
security fraud); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction: Where Was the SEC When the Mutual
Fund Scandal Happened?, LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 46, 46, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/review_coffee_mar apr04.msp (suggesting
that regulatory competition by the New York attorney general with the SEC helped stem various
abuses in the mutual fund industry).
8. Erik F. Gerding, Bubbles, Law, and Regulation 9 (May. 19, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (draft on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
9. See generally infra Part III.A (discussing the means of persuasion that the Taxpayer
Advocate Service employs to counter IRS inaction).
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consumer participation programs that resemble regulatory contrarians.10 For
instance, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners appoints
approximately twenty consumer representatives.11 And it is quite common
for agencies to have affiliated inspectors general or research programs that
can also be viewed as regulatory contrarians.12 There are also quasi-
contrarian strategies that have some but not all of the elements by which we
define contrarians. The Government Accountability Office—which does
not qualify as a contrarian because it is not affiliated with a specific
agency—is a prime example.13
Despite the pervasiveness of contrarians in the current regulatory
state, their commonalities have not been fully appreciated in the existing
literature.14 Partially for this reason, the potential of contrarians to promote
regulatory adaptation to market change has been cabined to relatively
narrow domains, at least in the financial realm.15 For instance, both
10. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 62–64 (2011) (exploring the role that public advocates can play in
limiting the risk of regulatory capture).
11. See generally infra Part III.B (describing successful efforts of the NAIC’s consumer
representatives to combat regulatory inaction).
12. See generally infra Part III.C–D (describing the capacity of inspectors general and
“research contrarians” in combating regulatory inaction).
13. See infra Part III.E.
14. There are two related literatures. First, there is a robust literature in the administrative
law context aimed at countering regulatory inaction. Several contributions to this literature focus
on empowering a single agency with countering such inaction. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L.
Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1277–80
(2006); Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Committee, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 372 (2009).
These proposals, however, primarily focus on the prospect that an agency will make a specific
decision not to act in the face of clear, existing statutory authority, a prospect reflected in the
EPA’s approach to regulating carbon. See id. at 393 (“Congress should enact a statute that creates
a new, independent administrative agency to oversee, monitor, and evaluate decisions by
Executive Branch agencies not to implement their existing statutory authority.”). By contrast, our
focus is on failure to act due to market adaptation, which typically involves failure to act coupled
with failure to realize that one is failing to act. The second set of related literatures examines
specific entities that we identify as contrarians. For instance, there is a substantial literature on
inspectors general. See, e.g., PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS
GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 1–8 (1993); Michael R. Bromwich, Running
Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2027–28 (1998).
Similarly, there is a substantial literature on ombudsman organizations, although this literature
tends to focus less on their role as a contrarian. See, e.g., WENDY GINSBERG & FREDERICK M.
KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34606, FEDERAL COMPLAINT-HANDLING, OMBUDSMAN,
AND ADVOCACY OFFICES 1–5 (2009), available at http://assets
.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34606_20090804.pdf. These literatures, however, typically fail to link the
similar roles played by inspectors general, consumer advocates, ombudsmen, and research
contrarians.
15. It may be that regulatory contrarians currently, or historically, have figured more
prominently in other regulatory domains, particularly environmental regulation. For instance, the
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ombudsman contrarians and consumer contrarians are typically envisioned
to empower consumers and keep regulators abreast of the consumer
experience.16 Their usefulness is consequently tethered to the consumer-
protection context. By contrast, the scope of investigative and research
contrarians is typically constrained to domains in which they enjoy
particular methodological competence: inspectors general are generally
limited to investigating past instances of misconduct or waste, and research
contrarians produce academic papers that only broadly and haphazardly
inform day-to-day regulatory policy.17 In sum, the capacity of existing
contrarians to induce proactive financial regulation has historically been
limited to specific pockets of regulatory activities.
Financial reform as outlined in the Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank” or
“the Act”)18 substantially expands the role of regulatory contrarians. In fact,
one of the most distinctive structural characteristics of Dodd-Frank is its
embrace of contrarian and quasi-contrarian strategies. The Act not only
contains examples of all the types of contrarian and quasi-contrarian
mechanisms identified in this Article, but it also dramatically expands on
the historical limitations of regulatory contrarians. In particular, Dodd-
Frank jettisons the subject-matter boundaries of prior financial contrarians,
pushing contrarian institutions into the realm of systemic and prudential
risk regulation. The Act also transcends various methodological restrictions
of contrarians, directing “investigative” contrarians to be more proactive
and “academic” contrarians to be more policy oriented. In sum, Congress
seems to have understood both that it lacked the understanding to fully
anticipate and draft all needed new rules, and also that contrarian
institutions can improve the capacity of regulators to adapt to changing
market conditions and structures. Of course, these strategies will certainly
not eliminate the impediments to effective regulatory adaptation, but they
may marginally limit them, which is still an important result.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by describing in broad
brush strokes the impediments that regulators face in adapting to ever-
changing financial markets. Part II offers a definition of contrarians and
speculates how regulatory contrarians might counteract the difficulties
reviewed in Part I. Part III describes the variants of regulatory contrarians
Environmental Protection Agency public liaison is authorized to investigate cases where it
suspects improper agency action. See GINSBERG & KAISER, supra note 14, at 14.
16. See infra Part III.A–B.
17. See generally infra Part III.C–D (describing the functions of inspectors general and
research contrarians).
18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2011)).
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that currently exist in financial regulation, offering a four-part typology.
Finally, Part IV closes by exploring the ways in which financial reform, in
Dodd-Frank and elsewhere, extends the use of contrarians to attempt to
more broadly limit the risks of regulatory inaction. It also considers several
preliminary lessons that the older generation of financial regulatory
contrarians may offer for the new generation.
I. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND ADAPTATION
All regulators must adapt to change in order to remain effective.19 But
in many ways, adaptation is particularly important for financial
regulators.20 The markets and firms that financial regulators oversee are
constantly shifting, often in ways that are difficult to observe or predict.
Moreover, the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of modern
financial markets means that apparently unrelated changes can have
unforeseeable and synergistic impacts on the financial system as a whole.21
For these reasons, market change can result in regulators operating under
inappropriate laws or assumptions. Often, this is a product of their failure
to enact new rules. But regulators’ failure to evolve can also involve the
continuation of rules or policies that have become ineffective or
counterproductive in light of market change, or that were simply mistakes
in the first place.22
19. The need for such adaptation figures particularly prominently in the academic literature
on environmental regulation. See generally Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an
Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455 (2011) (analyzing the “information problems”
affecting adaptive management strategies). Of course, adaptation in the environmental context
presents many of its own challenges, as regulators must adjust to the complexities and
uncertainties of the underlying ecosystem. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change,
Dead Zones, and the Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 97–98 (2010).
20. For some discussions of agency inaction in the context of financial regulation, see
Coffee, supra note 7, at 46; Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About
Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1596–1612 (2006);
Donna M. Nagy, Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 11,
17–18 (2006). For an argument that the U.S. financial regulatory system has not adequately
adapted to the blurring of traditional categories of financial institutions, see Charles K.
Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16–28 (2010).
21. See Steven Schwarcz & Iman Anabtawi, Regulating Systemic Risk, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670017 (exploring how “two otherwise independent correlations
can combine to transmit localized economic shocks into broader systemic crises”).
22. A prime potential candidate here might be the continuation of housing agencies such as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. One of us has elsewhere called for the elimination of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. See Brett H. McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions
During and After a Financial Crisis 46–47 (Minn. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 11-09,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=1753760. It is hotly
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Unfortunately, financial regulators face various impediments to
effectively evolving along with the markets they regulate.23 This Part
provides a broad overview of these difficulties. Section A focuses on the
prospect that even properly motivated regulators may fail to appropriately
adapt to change due to mistakes, ignoring some market changes while
exaggerating others. Section B, by contrast, describes the limited incentives
that regulators may have to evolve with regulated marketplaces.
Throughout, this Part emphasizes that many of the difficulties that financial
regulators face in adapting to change cut across different types of financial
regulation. Whether they are seeking to protect consumers or investors on
the one hand, or seeking to limit externalities by preserving firm or
systemic stability on the other, many cognitive failures and incentive
distortions create similar obstacles to change. But the relative importance
of cognitive failures versus incentive distortions may differ for consumer
protection as opposed to systemic risk, with regulatory capture being a
more pronounced problem for consumer protection and cognitive errors a
more pronounced problem for systemic risk.
A. Regulators and Cognitive Failures
Like all individuals, regulators are subject to various heuristics and
biases that produce predictable and systematic errors.24 Several heuristics
debated how much of a role these government-sponsored entities played in causing the financial
crisis. Some argue they played at most a small role. See, e.g., Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The
Slump Goes On: Why?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 30, 2010, at 57, 58, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/sep/30/ slump-goes-why/. Others argue that their
role was significant. See, e.g., Raghuram Rajan, Reviewing Krugman, CHI. BOOTH BLOG: FAULT
LINES (Sept. 16, 2010), http://forums .chicagobooth.edu/faultlines?entry=24. The congressional
panel on the causes of the crisis split by political party over the role of these entities. See Kevin
Drawbaugh & Dave Clarke, Flawed Report Seen from U.S. Financial Crisis Panel, REUTERS
(Jan. 12, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/01/11/idINIndia-54087320110111. Still, even if
one does not believe these entities were a major cause of the crisis, their original goal of
developing a securitization market for mortgages has long-since been achieved, and private actors
are now quite actively fulfilling that role. Another, less high-profile, illustration of regulators’
failure to evolve by continuing ineffective or outdated policies involves insurance regulators’
retention of formulaic reserve requirements for life insurers. See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating
Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1765–66 (2010).
23. There is substantial literature within the administrative law field documenting agency
ossification and inaction more generally. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A
Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 297–307
(2009) (discussing the impact of judicial review on agency ossification).
24. The foundational work in behavioral economics is Tversky and Kahneman’s initial
discussion of prospect theory. See generally PETER A. DIAMOND ET AL., BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2007) (providing a survey of recent scholarship on
behavioral economics and its applications); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) (providing an introduction to the field of
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and biases are particularly likely to interfere with financial regulators’
adaptation to market change. First, various biases may undermine
regulatory efforts by distorting regulators’ perceptions of risks in the
markets they regulate. It is well known that the perception of risk is
impacted by the cognitive availability of the underlying risks, with
individuals tending to place undue weight on relatively recent and salient
events and tending to underappreciate less salient and recent risks.25 Social
amplification of risk can exacerbate this bias as media report and reflect the
most extreme, recent, and “newsworthy” risks.26
Even though experts are generally less susceptible to these biases than
lay people,27 distortions in risk perceptions can nonetheless undermine
financial regulators’ adaptation to changing market conditions. This is most
obvious in the context of prudential and systemic risk regulation. Financial
regulation has historically been marked by a strikingly procyclical pattern
of regulation in which risks are downplayed when times are good and
overemphasized during periods of crisis.28 This tendency to procyclical
enforcement contrasts starkly with the countercyclical pattern that ought to
behavioral finance and its focus on the challenges to efficient markets based on human fallibility);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (discussing the “cognitive biases that stem from reliance on judgmental
heuristics”). Behavioral economics has been applied to the analysis of law in the new field of
behavioral law and economics. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2000) (providing a survey of recent scholarship on behavioral economics and its
application to the law). Much of the initial work applying behavioral research in the legal domain
emphasized that markets do not work as well as assumed by law and economics scholars, thus
leaving greater room for potentially efficient regulatory interventions. See generally Christine
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998)
(exploring positive, prescriptive, and normative applications of behavioral economics to the law).
More recent work, though, emphasizes that regulators are people, too, and hence subject to the
same sorts of heuristics and biases that limit the efficiency of markets. See Stephen J. Choi &
A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 549, 553–54 (2002).
25. See generally THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (Paul Slovic ed., 2000) (compiling twenty-five
years of research on risk perception).
26. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (2007) (providing an
extensive discussion of how risk perception can affect regulation); THE SOCIAL AMPLIFICATION
OF RISK (Paul Slovic et al. eds., 2003) (reviewing the ways in which mass media and social
communication affect human risk perception).
27. See Cass Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1123–24 (2002) (book
review) (arguing in favor of a technocratic view of regulation because experts are less susceptible
to distortions in risk perception than lay people).
28. See JACK GUTTENTAG & RICHARD HERRING, DISASTER MYOPIA IN INTERNATIONAL
BANKING 3–4 (1986); Gerding, supra note 8, at 4–5.
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characterize governmental regulation of systemic risk.29 An important
explanation for this pattern is simply that financial risks are not cognitively
available during the peak of a credit cycle, but are obviously both salient
and immediate during times of financial crisis. Broad financial downturns
also tend to result in the revelation of individual scandals, creating a
perceived pattern.30 Social amplification of risk likely exacerbates these
patterns.31
Regulators’ distorted perceptions of risk can also undermine their
capacity to adapt to new consumer protection challenges. Regulators often
set their consumer protection priorities based on consumer complaint
patterns and recent headlines.32 Yet many consumer protection problems
develop and persist in competitive marketplaces precisely because they are
neither observable to consumers nor salacious enough to generate
headlines.33 At the same time, when consumer protection issues do result in
scandal, regulators may over-respond, channeling their energies into
problems that do not exist and misallocating scarce resources.
A second group of biases may impede effective adaptation to change
by causing financial regulators to have undue confidence in their regulatory
approaches and to be overly dismissive of the need to adjust in the face of
market changes. Overconfidence in one’s abilities to identify problems and
prescribe solutions is a persistent feature of human existence,34 and it is
particularly prevalent among “experts,” such as those who tend to drive
regulatory policy.35 Confirmation bias exacerbates the problem: once
regulators have put rules on the books, they will tend to interpret
ambiguous evidence in a manner suggesting the effectiveness of their
29. See infra Part II (discussing how regulatory contrarians could help agencies maintain
their vigilance by pointing out issues and potential problems that are not receiving enough
attention by that agency).
30. See Amitai Aviram, Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law, 25 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 8–9 (2008).
31. Id. at 9.
32. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the
British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735, 770–79
(2009). See generally KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE
CASE OF INSURANCE (1998) (outlining the important role that media attention, particularly in the
form of headlines, has often played in setting the consumer protection agenda of insurance
regulators).
33. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2011) (manuscript at 6 n.13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1687909.
34. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 24, at 28–29; Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24, at
579.
35. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24, at 579.
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choices.36 So too does groupthink.37 In most cases, the leadership of
agencies will be a cohesive group, with people selected for leadership
positions because of their relationship with and/or shared perspective with
the agency head. In this context, regulators will tend to gravitate to shared
ideas, even when the group’s preexisting perspectives do not necessarily
entail those ideas.38 Once this happens, group members will tend not to
challenge the accepted notions of the group. Such groupthink can interact
with and intensify confirmation bias, making it very hard for an agency to
escape from the mindset that led to its current regulatory choices.
This cluster of biases will systematically tend to produce excessive
inaction in the face of market change.39 The most recent and salient
example of this is the Federal Reserve under chairman Alan Greenspan,
which confidently endorsed limited systemic and prudential risk
regulations despite dramatic increases in risk throughout the early and mid-
2000s.40 Although disentangling political ideology from cognitive bias in
this context is difficult, it seems clear in retrospect that overconfidence,
confirmation bias, and groupthink at least contributed to push the laissez-
faire inclinations of the Federal Reserve toward excessive disregard of
newly emerging systemic and prudential risks.41 The problem may be even
more severe in the consumer protection context, which is particularly
susceptible to ideological precommitments that may produce confirmation
bias.42 On one hand, consumer protection agencies may attract employees
who tend to see the industry with jaded eyes and extensive regulation with
overly rose-colored glasses. On the other hand, those who embrace free-
market ideologies may be particularly prone to interpreting all consumer
36. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 24, at 30.
37. See generally IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK (1972) (reviewing the effects
of groupthink on twentieth-century foreign-policy decisions).
38. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 541–43 (2002).
39. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24, at 560–61.
40. See generally KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS
(2011) (providing an overview of the subprime crisis and, in particular, the role of federal
regulators in sanctioning risky market practices).
41. See id.; see also Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How
Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 807, 825–28 (2009) (arguing that “intellectual hazard”—or the tendency of
behavioral biases to interfere with accurate thought and analysis within complex organizations—
contributed to the errors of the Federal Reserve in ignoring the housing bubble by promoting easy
credit, relying on the self-interest of lending institutions to check risk-taking, and endorsing the
idea of a “great moderation”).
42. Here, too, the approach of the Federal Reserve under Greenspan to subprime mortgages
constitutes an important example.
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protection issues through a lens focused on consumer autonomy and
healthy competition.
Bounded rationality—the cognitive limits of real individuals, as
opposed to the unlimited cognitive powers of the rational actor featured in
economic models43—can undermine regulatory adaptation even when it
does not produce specific heuristics or biases.44 Particularly in the United
States, rationality is likely to be asymmetrically bounded for financial
regulators as compared with financial market participants. Put more
bluntly, the best and the brightest are more likely to go into the private
sector than into government.45 That’s where the money and prestige are.
This fact makes it particularly difficult for regulators to keep up with
market change, as much financial innovation is specifically designed to
exploit regulatory loopholes. Regulated financial firms constantly seek to
avoid the costs of regulation through legal arbitrage, the process of
characterizing and/or designing financial products or services so that they
trigger the fewest regulatory costs.46 The multisectored nature of American
financial regulation makes such regulatory arbitrage a constant risk.47
Once again, these problems are common to the regulation of both
systemic risk and consumer protection. Consumer protection regulations
must constantly adjust to changing products and marketing that present
new risks for consumers. And regulatory efforts to limit one-sided
transactions or ensure transparency are virtually always subject to gaming
by a motivated––if small––group of firms and individuals that can make
money by exploiting consumer ignorance or mistakes. The same problems
clearly afflict the regulation of prudential and systemic risk, where
regulators must try to make sense of ever more complex financial products
43. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE 1–17 (2008) (distinguishing
between “humans” and “econs”).
44. Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, in MODELS OF MAN, SOCIAL
AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL
SETTING 241, 241–60 (1957) (proposing a model of human rationality that is more consistent
with the level of access to information and computational powers of real human beings than is
found in the traditional model of “economic man”); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded
Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449–50 (2003)
(integrating psychological findings about intuitions and choice into the model of reasoning
heuristics found in the author’s previous work).
45. See Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 13,
20 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009). We stress that this is just a tendency. Plenty of
very bright and dedicated persons enter government service because it better fits their personal
identity than the private sector.
46. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 332; Gerding, supra note 8, at 6.
47. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 332; Whitehead, supra note 20, at 3–8.
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and understand a vast and immensely complicated and interconnected
regulatory system.
Rationality need not be asymmetrically bounded to undermine
regulatory adaptation to market changes. Even deeply considered and
deliberate decisions guided by the most sophisticated understandings of the
economy may go badly wrong, as they did leading up to the financial
crisis.48 Systemic and prudential risk regulation are peculiarly susceptible to
this problem. In recent decades, advances in the modeling of financial risk
were supposed to greatly enhance our ability to understand and contain
both firm-level and systemic risk.49 That has not turned out so well.50 One
deep problem with these models appears to be that they entertained an
overly tame understanding of the risk facing financial markets, either by
underestimating the likelihood of extreme financial events,51 or by
purporting to assign numerical probabilities to certain types of risks that
ultimately reflect truly immeasurable uncertainty.52 Either way, the illusion
of science created false confidence in economics departments, business
schools, Wall Street, and ultimately financial regulators, who themselves
adopted the same models used by the academics and the regulated.
Regulators also increasingly turned to market participants’ own risk models
as the basis for regulations—Basel II capital requirements and credit rating
agency ratings of asset-backed securities are key examples.53 These models
were the work of the best and the brightest engaged in trying to understand
financial markets, but even the best and the brightest can get things
drastically wrong.54
48. The Basel II capital requirements are a good example. The Basel II guidelines, adopted
by the leading industrial nations, used banks’ own internal models to assess their risk. Those
internal models turned out to be untrustworthy. See Imad A. Moosa, Basel II as a Casualty of the
Global Financial Crisis, 11 J. BANKING REG. 95, 95–96 (2010).
49. See SCOTT D. PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES
CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 27–46 (2010).
50. See id. at 262–91.
51. BENOIT MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS: A
FRACTAL VIEW OF RISK, RUIN, AND REWARD 230–44 (2004). See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS
TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007) (exploring
limitations in our knowledge of the world and the consequent challenges of trying to predict the
future).
52. See generally Claire A. Hill, Justification Norms Under Uncertainty: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2011) (discussing the need to justify decisions
even though probabilities cannot be assigned); TALEB, supra note 51 (explaining how to cope
with uncertainty).
53. Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 128–30 (2009).
54. This indeed was the case for the book that popularized the phrase “the best and the
brightest.” See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972) (exploring
the decision making that plunged the United States into the Vietnam War).
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Adaptation in the consumer protection context is also complicated by
deep and fundamental limits to human understanding. Many will agree that
consumers and investors should be protected from exploitation but free to
make informed and fully considered financial decisions. Nonetheless,
potential consumer protection issues often generate inaction because it is
inherently difficult to know when consumers and investors are being
exploited and when they are making genuine choices.55 Whereas some
commentators invoke the power of the market to argue that regulation can
best promote consumer welfare by increasing transparency, others argue
that markets can promote exploitation in ways that are susceptible to
aggressive legal remedies.56 Who is right depends largely on what precisely
is meant by consumer autonomy and welfare––issues that do indeed stretch
the limits of human knowledge, albeit in philosophical rather than
mathematical dimensions.
B. Incentive Failures
An entire field of political science examines how the private
incentives of regulators and other government actors may conflict with
their pursuit of general social welfare.57 This section briefly considers two
prominent critiques that are particularly likely to distort adaptation in
financial regulation. First, public choice theory suggests that a small
number of people or corporations with similar interests and a relatively
large stake in regulatory outcomes will enjoy comparative success
organizing into effective lobbying groups.58 Such groups are better able to
overcome the free-rider problem than groups that have large numbers of
55. See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets, 3
ERASMUS L. REV. 23 (2010) (exploring the extent to which various observed “anomalies” in
consumers’ insurance decisions reflect genuine preferences or mistakes and arguing that it is
incredibly difficult to make this assessment in many cases).
56. This tension is captured well in an excellent exchange between Richard Epstein and
Oren Bar-Gill. See Oren Bar-Gill, Exchange: The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts,
92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 801–02 (2007) (arguing that “welfare-enhancing regulation is feasible”
but that “[r]egulation should only be considered where such specific evidence proves the
existence, in the specific market, of a behavioral market failure that generates significant welfare
costs”); Richard A. Epstein, Exchange: The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92
MINN. L. REV. 803, 803–04 (2007) (discussing concerns about legal interventions in consumer
contracts and how regulation that responds to consumer mistakes is more harmful than
beneficial).
57. See generally JEFFREY S. BANKS & ERIC A. HANUSHEK, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1995) (exploring the interactions between economic markets and politics).
58. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 7 (1971).
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persons each of whom has a small stake in the matter.59 This phenomenon
can result in special interests capturing regulators in the sense that they
unduly influence regulatory outcomes.60 As the financial sector has become
larger, more profitable, and more concentrated, regulatory capture has
become a growing concern, although suspicion of the influence of bankers
goes back to the Founding Fathers.61
The agency capture problem is both exemplified and exacerbated by
the revolving door. High-level financial regulators will frequently be
recruited from the ranks of industry and/or will go from their government
jobs into industry.62 Consider two of the most influential treasury
secretaries of recent decades, Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson, both
former leaders of Goldman Sachs. Even in the absence of explicit
corruption, regulators with such deep industry ties may have a mindset that
unduly favors the industry.63 They will tend to think that what is good for
the banks is good for the country, which is sometimes true, but not always.
Regulatory capture will often blunt regulators’ incentives to adapt to
newly emerging financial risks, as risk tends to generate short-term
profitability in the financial sphere.64 This is particularly true in the context
of consumer protection, where regulated entities have quite strong interests
in deregulation, and consumers, the beneficiaries of regulation, are a large,
dispersed group of individuals, each with a limited stake in regulatory
outcomes.65 But, as the recent financial crisis suggests, regulatory capture
59. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53 (1965); see also
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 33–36 (1958) (discussing an individual’s
rational decision-making process when placed in a collective group).
60. See Stigler, supra note 58, at 11–12.
61. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 14 (2010).
62. See generally Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door:
Making Sense of Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y 61, 62 (1992) (noting that “[t]he
empirical fact of the revolving door is beyond dispute,” but arguing that it may not lead to the
type of regulatory capture that many claim).
63. Recently, this phenomenon has been termed “cognitive capture.” See Gerald P.
O’Driscoll Jr., Op-Ed., An Economy of Liars, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2010, at A21 (describing
“ ‘cognitive capture,’ by which regulators become incapable of thinking in terms other than that
of the industry”).
64. Of course, some newly emerging risks may jeopardize industry interests, in which case
regulatory capture can have the opposite effect of prompting overly aggressive regulatory
intervention in response to these changes.
65. See Barkow, supra note 10, at 64–65 (describing consumer protection as “a prototypical
example of asymmetrical interest group pressure opposing the general public interest” because
the industries that consumer protection regulators “are charged with regulating are typically far
more powerful and well financed than the consumers whose interests they are charged with
protecting”).
MCDONNELL&SCHWARCZ.PTD 6/13/2011 2:05 PM
1644 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
can also undermine adaptive systemic risk regulation, as regulated
industries have an insufficient stake in systemic stability. Whereas
individual firms can often capture the benefits of risk taking, the costs can
be externalized to the economy as a whole, particularly in light of the
prospect of governmental bailouts.66 This form of regulatory capture is a
much larger problem at the peak of the credit cycle, when the public is
usually rationally ignorant of financial regulation. By contrast, during times
of financial crisis the power of lobbying groups can be offset by the
concentrated, if short-lived, attention of the public.
A second prominent critique of regulators’ incentives––which
straightforwardly cuts across all forms of financial regulation––is simply
that principal-agent problems tend to result in limited bureaucratic
motivation to adapt to change.67 Regulators are agents who are supposed to
act in the interests of their principal, the public. Like all agents, though,
they may be tempted to pursue their own selfish interests by not working
hard to accomplish this. Figuring out what form financial regulation should
take is hard work. In a sense, the task is infinite, and regulators inevitably
must draw a line at how far they go in exploring options before acting. This
is of course the bounded rationality point discussed above. But regulators
may not choose to explore as far as they could and should, or as they would
if they really gave the public interest the weight it deserves. After all, one
of the attractions of lower-paying government jobs is that the hours are a
lot better than investment banking. At the same time, the principal-agent
problem may also take the form of regulators advancing rules that increase
their own power and prestige.68 It is possible that this agency cost may
actually produce excessive responsiveness to market change.
II. A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR CONTRARIANS
We define a regulatory contrarian as an individual or entity possessing
three distinctive features. First, a regulatory contrarian must be at least
partially affiliated with a particular regulatory body but simultaneously
enjoy meaningful independence from that agency.69 That independence can
66. See generally Steven Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the “Subprime”
Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 558 (2009) (describing the moral hazard created by any
bailout plan).
67. See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971) (developing a theory of bureaucratic behavior).
68. See id. at 38, 114.
69. Compare this to the proposals offered by Staszewski and by Bagley and Revesz, which
both suggest that independent entities such as the Congressional Budget Office, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), and GAO combat regulatory inaction. See supra
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result from the contrarian’s budget, staffing, appointment and removal
process, or even institutional culture. Second, a regulatory contrarian must
possess persuasive influence over its affiliated agency by virtue of its
position, access to media and officials, or speaking engagements and
reports. At the same time, regulatory contrarians must have limited, if any,
actual regulatory authority. Finally, regulatory contrarians must be tasked
with studying and identifying deficiencies and potential improvements in
the regulatory process, regulatory policy, and/or the regulated market.
Their focus should be entirely on regulatory policy and the internal
processes that produce that policy, whether they are rulemaking or patterns
of adjudication.70 Entities or regulatory strategies that meet only some of
these conditions can be thought of as “quasi-contrarian.”
The key (but not only) job of contrarians is to counteract agency
inaction or ossification in the face of changing market risks.71 While
numerous mechanisms promote accountability with respect to affirmative
agency action (though contrarians can help here, too), few tools combat the
risk of excessive agency inaction.72 For instance, judicial review of agency
decision making is much more robust than judicial review of agency
inaction.73 Notice and comment rulemaking is only required when rules are
actually proposed. Legislative oversight is most likely to be an effective
check against affirmative agency proposals or public and salient regulatory
failures, rather than the gradual failure to adapt to changing markets.74 To
the extent that super-agencies such as the Office of Information and
note 14 and accompanying text. Within our framework, these entities would be considered
“quasi-contrarians” because they are not affiliated with any particular regulatory entity.
70. Some literature suggests that agencies tend to make policy through adjudication rather
than rulemaking because the former is subject to less robust judicial review. See JERRY L.
MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 24–25 (1990).
71. This is a broader role than that envisioned by Staszewski as well as commentators who
promote more robust judicial review of agency inaction. See, e.g., Staszewski, supra note 14, at
393. Those commentators are focused on an agency’s specific decision not to act. Id. (“Congress
should enact a statute that creates a new, independent administrative agency to oversee, monitor,
and evaluate decisions by Executive Branch agencies not to implement their existing statutory
authority.”).
72. See id.
73. “Although agency inaction is sometimes grounds for legal challenge, in practice it is
extremely difficult to drag an agency into court to defend its policymaking reticence.” Jacob E.
Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the
Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1188 (2009); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1667–
69 (2004) (explaining how the Court “insulate[d]” agency inaction from judicial review through
its decision in Heckler). For an illustrative case, see Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542
U.S. 55 (2003).
74. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency
Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (1994).
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Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) address agency inaction, that focus is heavily
tilted toward identifying existing regulations that should be relaxed rather
than identifying new areas that require regulation.75 And agency self-
regulation usually takes the form of limiting agency discretion.76 Not only
do most existing regulatory oversight mechanisms fail to address the
problem of regulatory inaction, but they in many ways exacerbate it by
increasing the costs of change.77
Unlike existing accountability tools, regulatory contrarians may be
able to promote affirmative agency adaptation and action.78 Although
regulatory contrarians may well resist agency actions or initiatives, they
will tend to have less reason to focus on these issues precisely because of
the robust set of accountability tools that affirmative regulatory actions
already trigger. Contrarians––who will themselves no doubt be influenced
by political incentives––will have less to gain by merely contributing to the
cacophony of public comments to a proposed rule. By contrast, their unique
access to information coupled with their persuasive authority should give
them a comparative advantage in emphasizing regulatory shortcomings and
inaction. Contrarians can be further encouraged to focus on agency
adaptation to market change by developing metrics that track how often
affirmative policy prescriptions originating from contrarians, rather than
their affiliated agencies, are adopted, although such metrics may
themselves cause problems.79
Contrarians can promote adaptation by pointing out, and advocating
on behalf of, arguments and alternatives that are not currently being
75. See Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1355, 1399–1402 (2009). For further discussion of OIRA as a quasi-contrarian, see infra Part
III.E.
76. Indeed, Magill defines self-regulation in this way. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-
Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 860 (2009) (arguing that agencies take numerous
measures to limit their own discretion even when they are not required to do so by some source of
authority).
77. Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About
Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 62–73 (1995); see also Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Introduction to ECONOMICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at xiii, xvii (Susan Rose-
Ackerman ed., 2009) (discussing how “[p]rocedures that limit the ability of an agency to drift
away from the aims of Congress may also mean that the agency is unresponsive to technical
innovations and new data”).
78. Erik Gerding alludes to the same point. See Gerding, supra note 8, at 21–22 (“Unlike the
traditional checks and balances of political theory, which are designed to curb political action (in
order to prevent excessive concentration of power), however, the checks described below also
address the problem of policy inaction.”).
79. See infra Part IV.B (developing this theme in further detail).
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considered within an agency or not receiving adequate attention.80
Contrarians should be constantly looking out for persons who are speaking
out against the prevailing received wisdom. These arguments need not
always involve substantive regulatory decisions––just as often, regulatory
contrarians may focus on procedural deficiencies in how a particular
viewpoint or position has evolved within the regulatory apparatus. In all
cases, these perspectives should be informed by the contrarian’s privileged
access to, and understanding of, the information, practices, and culture of
its affiliated regulator and market conditions. Moreover, contrarians should
build on their relationship with their affiliated agencies to cultivate
understanding and appreciation of alternative viewpoints.81
Regulatory contrarians that raise awareness of alternative arguments
and issues may help to counteract the various cognitive biases identified in
Part I. Although there is clearly no single magic bullet, an ever-growing
literature suggests that various procedural mechanisms can help to debias
individuals.82 To date, the literature suggests that some of the most
effective debiasing techniques involve forcing decision makers to (1) take
an outsider perspective on their work, (2) consider the opposite outcome to
which they are inclined to take, (3) interact during the decision-making
process with persons with differing backgrounds and biases, and (4)
publicly defend their positions.83 Not coincidentally, regulatory contrarians
80. To limit intellectual hazard in financial institutions, Miller and Rosenfeld advocate for
policies that “introduce greater skepticism and independent judgment into the processes by which
firms in the financial sector evaluate information and make policies related to risk.” Miller &
Rosenfeld, supra note 41, at 836. We suggest that extending this effort to regulators themselves
would be advisable.
81. As Rachlinski and Farina note, “self-generated agency use of external and internal
strategies for multiplying professional perspectives is highly desirable” because such mechanisms
“minimize[] defensiveness—thereby increasing policymakers’ willingness to take steps to
improve their own decisional processes.” Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24, at 600. Similarly,
some have argued that the liberalization of the rules governing standing to sue was intended to
prevent the “decisional perspective from which the agency in question approached its problem
[from becoming] too narrow” and ensure that “its decisional frame . . . be broadened, [by]
exposure not only to additional information . . . but new decisional referents.” Daniel J. Gifford,
Decisions, Decisional Referents, and Administrative Justice, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 42–
43 (1972).
82. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199, 200–01, 236 tbl.A1 (2006) (discussing both substantive and procedural mechanisms
that debias individuals); Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision Making Be Improved?
3–4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-102, 2008), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-102.pdf (describing many strategies for debiasing which in
turn, improve decision making).
83. Milkman et al., supra note 82, at 5–6 (describing studies finding that forcing individuals
to take an outsider’s view on their work and to consider the opposite outcome successfully
debiased the individuals); Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24, at 588 (“Cognitive psychological
research indicates that one of the best mechanisms for reducing overconfident judgments is
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are designed so that they induce regulators to take precisely these types of
steps in their regulatory processes. Their independence and contrarian
orientation can prompt regulators to consider alternative viewpoints, and
their persuasive authority can lead regulators to anticipate the possibility, or
reality, that they will have to publicly defend their positions. Because
contrarians lack actual regulatory authority, they can focus their energy on
playing the role of devil’s advocate.84 At the same time, contrarians’
affiliation with a specific agency can ensure that those within that agency
are consistently exposed to alternative viewpoints. Of course, contrarians
may develop their own preferred viewpoints and not give adequate voice to
a variety of points of view. And even if the contrarians do give voice to
many viewpoints, there is no guarantee that regulators will listen to them.
But effective contrarians will hopefully be able to have some real influence
on at least some policies and problems.
Contrarians created by crisis legislation may be able to debias
regulators in another way by producing a sort of regulatory time-shift.
Legislatures are subject to many of the same political economy forces as
regulators, meaning that robust financial reform tends to be possible only
after large financial crises when public attention to the issue can offset
regulatory capture.85 However, legislators enacting financial reform in the
midst of a crisis must typically delegate substantial responsibility to
regulators for at least two reasons. First, the midst of a recession or
depression following a financial crisis is not actually the best time to put
stricter financial rules in place—such rules are likely to constrict the
provision of credit, and at such moments we want credit to expand, not
contract.86 Second, the precise details of financial reform are often difficult
to specify. However, by the time regulators can implement crisis
legislation, regulatory capture and availability bias may take hold, resulting
in the agency adopting an overly pro-industry stance. That is a common
pattern for legislation in response to visible crises.87 Contrarians may be
able to disrupt this prospect by continually invoking the salient imagery of
forcing oneself to consider alternatives and carefully review arguments against one’s own
position.”).
84. Indeed, the devil’s advocate is a famous ancient example of a contrarian institution.
85. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 92 (2003) (noting that major
changes in financial regulation are particularly likely during financial crises, with the New Deal
reforms being the most obvious and important example).
86. Congress recognized this point in the Dodd-Frank Act and directed agencies to enact
countercyclical capital requirements. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 616, 124 Stat. 1376, 1615–16 (2010) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2011)).
87. See id.
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the crisis, thus reminding regulators of the need for reform and helping to
keep them honest as they promulgate rules implementing the crisis
legislation.
Contrarians may also be able to help address some of the high-level
cognitive failures of regulation by serving as a sort of intermediary between
regulators and academics. Although copious amounts of academic work
across the disciplines bear on optimal regulatory policy, regulators often
have limited resources and willingness to consider this research.88 In part,
this is attributable to some of the biases described above, including
optimism and confirmatory bias. But it is also because academics and
regulators often communicate to different audiences using different
language in different forums.89 Contrarians––who are specifically tasked
with investigating alternative viewpoints––are an ideal mechanism for
helping regulators better leverage this work.
The incentive failures described in Part I may also be mitigated by the
efforts of an effective contrarian. Contrarians’ access to regulators and their
persuasive influence means that they are well positioned to serve as a
whistle-blower and critic of regulatory capture. Of course, contrarians may
themselves be subject to the threat of regulatory capture, but this is less
likely than standard regulatory capture. First, unlike regulators, there is less
need for contrarians to have work experience within the regulated industry.
This is because the position is less all-encompassing than that of a
regulator, with a contrarian able to focus his or her attention on a few
specific issues of concern. Not only does this limit the risk of the revolving
door into contrarian offices, but it also limits the revolving door out of
these offices: to the extent that contrarians have broad-based experience
and expertise, it is much easier as a practical matter to set strict limits on
their ability to work in the regulated industry after their tenure. Still, there
is a danger if contrarians are too disconnected from relevant experience, as
they may not know enough to fully understand the industry. To alleviate
the problem, contrarian offices may often want to have some role for
industry insiders as well. Second, the risk of regulatory capture is limited
by the fact that contrarians have no (or limited) regulatory authority and
must rely on persuasion and public pressure to exert power. A paradox
limits this effect: if a contrarian office develops a reputation for successful
persuasion, that may make the office subject to more lobbying and
regulatory capture. We do not think that contrarians can fully counter
88. See Mitchell Weiss, Preface to NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 7, 7–8 (David
Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009) (emphasizing the disjunction between academic knowledge
about regulation and the theoretical knowledge actually employed by regulators).
89. See id.
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regulatory capture within agencies by any stretch of the imagination, but
we hope they can help.
Regulatory contrarians may also make regulators work harder and
more diligently. Knowing that their actions and decisions are being
scrutinized and critiqued by an independent entity with privileged access to
the agency and significant reputational capital can increase regulators’
incentives to adapt to new circumstances.90 Not only does this limit the risk
of public shaming by the contrarian, but it also increases the prospect of
praise and encouragement.91 Contrarians need not be curmudgeons.
To be sure, regulatory contrarians may resemble some other
mechanisms for promoting diverse viewpoints within agencies. In
particular, contrarians resemble minority members in multimember
commissions, particularly when a requirement exists that the commission
be balanced between competing political parties.92 But there are also
important differences in these two institutional design features, resulting in
each having their own distinctive benefits and weaknesses. Here we
emphasize several benefits of contrarians relative to multimember boards in
promoting effective regulatory adaptation. First, members of a commission
may be less free than contrarians to focus on issues that might not
otherwise be on an agency’s agenda. Whereas board members must
familiarize themselves with all of the key issues before the commission,
contrarians are free to focus their energies on particular targeted initiatives
that may not currently be priorities within the agency. Second, the
dynamics among board members are likely to be different than the
dynamics of contrarians and their affiliated regulators. Because they have
the authority to vote on controversial issues, minority board members will
often seek compromise. By contrast, contrarians are liberated from the
practical necessity to compromise (although compromise may often be
strategically beneficial) by virtue of the fact that they hold no actual power.
90. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 28 (1995) (exploring how OIRA review can improve regulation because regulators
know that their work will be scrutinized by an expert entity with privileged access to
information).
91. For one example of this, consider the award that NAIC consumer representatives give
annually to a state insurance regulator in recognition of their consumer protection efforts. See
Colorado Insurance Commissioner Recognized for Consumer Advocacy, INS. J. (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2010/10/21/114247.htm.
92. See generally Barkow, supra note 10, at 37–41 (discussing that minority members act as
a “built-in monitoring system” that prevents the committee from becoming too polarized).
Contrarians may also replicate some of the benefits of interagency lobbying that others have
described. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2217, 2231 (2005) (exploring how lobbying by outside agencies can be effective
counterweight against industry pressure).
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Third, disagreement among competing board members is often deeply
political.93 Contrarians, however, are meant to question assumptions and
receive wisdom irrespective of politics. Finally, the mechanisms of dissent
available to minority board members and contrarians differ. Minority board
members often issue formal dissents from agency decisions, but they tend
not to be oriented toward mobilizing public opinion on the issue.94
Contrarians do not have a formal vote on regulatory policies, but, precisely
for this reason, they are likely to be more adept at mobilizing public
pressure through media contacts, formal speaking engagements, and
regular reports. After all, persuasion is the primary tool available to
contrarians to effect change.
Contrarians, of course, will often be ineffective, particularly to the
extent that regulatory policy is influenced by strongly held ideological
beliefs or political incentives within a particular administration or agency.
Contrarians are inevitably doomed to sometimes—nay, often—play the
role of Cassandra. The hope is simply that sometimes the agencies will
actually heed the warnings, at least up to a point. But we do think that wise
governance requires listening to those who disagree with you and at least
sometimes actually acting upon their insights. Wise governance does
sometimes happen, and we hope that contrarians can on occasion increase
its incidence.
III. EXISTING CONTRARIAN AND QUASI-CONTRARIAN MODELS
This Part offers a typology of regulatory contrarians. It describes four
different types of financial regulatory contrarians that currently exist at the
federal and state levels: ombudsman contrarians, consumer representative
contrarians, investigative contrarians, and research contrarians. In doing so,
Part III suggests that existing contrarians can indeed promote affirmative
agency adaptation as described in Part II. In particular, ombudsmen and
consumer representatives can encourage regulatory initiatives by
amplifying the voice of consumers, pushing back against industry capture,
and overcoming confirmation bias and distortions in regulators’ risk
perceptions. Similarly, investigative contrarians, such as inspectors general,
can counteract regulatory overconfidence and laziness while research
93. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 461 (2008) (characterizing minority
party members of commissions as “ideological partisans committed to the agenda of the
opposition party”).
94. See Barkow, supra note 10, at 41 (describing the ways in which minority members of
boards can dissent, which can, in turn, serve as a “fire alarm” that activates the scrutiny of
Congress and the public).
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contrarians can bring together high-level academic theory and
policymaking. Whether these programs and institutions accomplish these
objectives efficiently or produce counteracting costs is a topic for another
day.
At the same time that it demonstrates some of the theory of Parts I and
II in action, this Part also reveals that the scope of existing contrarian
models is dramatically limited in one of two ways. In particular, the first
two types of contrarians––ombudsmen and consumer representative
contrarians––are both currently limited to the consumer protection or
service domain, despite the suggestions above that contrarians can also be
useful with respect to other forms of financial regulation. By contrast,
while the second two types of contrarians––investigative and research
contrarians––currently serve an important role in a wide range of financial
agencies, their methodological emphasis and the scale of their jurisdiction
dramatically circumscribe these roles.
Finally, this Part also describes a category of “quasi-contrarians” that
do not satisfy the basic definition of a contrarian, but nonetheless serve a
similar function. Here, it focuses on the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”), which is not affiliated with any particular regulatory body and
thus does not meet the first element of the contrarian definition. This Part
shows how this feature of the GAO may limit its capacity to serve the core
function of regulatory contrarians, promoting regulatory adaptation to
changing market conditions.
A. Ombudsman Contrarians
Several different contrarians have evolved out of ombudsman offices.
Although the term “ombudsman” is quite malleable, it typically refers to an
independent entity or person that is tasked with responding to complaints
concerning a specific government agency or other type of institution.95 In
many instances, of course, entities that process complaints are in a
privileged position to identify systemic problems or concerns with the
underlying entity. Patterns of complaints, for instance, are often indicative
of a larger problem in an organization or institution.96 Indeed, many
regulators use patterns of consumer complaints about private firms to guide
their regulatory energies.97
Given their privileged position in identifying and understanding
institutional problems with the entities they are associated with,
95. See Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 738.
96. See id. at 801–02.
97. See id. at 753.
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ombudsmen often take on the role of a contrarian.98 Such ombudsmen are
often described as “advocacy ombuds.”99 In some cases, ombudsmen are
specifically imbued with this authority. In particular, some ombudsmen are
formally authorized to (1) proactively investigate issues that are not
necessarily raised by a specific complaint, (2) make specific
recommendations for changes in organizational or institutional structure,
and (3) suggest changes to the underlying agency’s structure, organization,
or authority in published reports or testimony to an overseeing entity.100 In
other instances, however, an ombudsman may act as a contrarian simply in
the course of attempting to investigate and resolve specific suits.101
Perhaps the most well-known ombudsman contrarian is the Taxpayer
Advocate Service (“TAS”) within the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).102
Originally named the “Taxpayer Ombudsman,” one of the central functions
of the office is to help resolve taxpayer complaints and answer taxpayer
inquiries.103 At the same time, TAS is tasked with proposing changes in
legislation and IRS administrative practices designed to improve the IRS’s
relationship with taxpayers.104 TAS uses several mechanisms to promote
these changes through the force of persuasion.105 For instance, TAS issues
98. See generally GINSBERG & KAISER, supra note 14, at 2–3 (noting that the federal
government has “multifarious forms of ombudsmen-like offices,” some of which “examine the
agency’s operations” and proactively evaluate its effectiveness in the relevant communities);
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Independent Advocacy Agencies Within Agencies: A Survey of Federal
Agency External Ombudsmen, Report to National Taxpayer Advocate, at iv (June 2003)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
99. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 535, 549 (2002) (defining an advocate ombud as on ombudsman that “serves
as an advocate on behalf of a population that is designated in the charter”).
100. GINSBERG & KAISER, supra note 14, at 14.
101. See Lubbers, supra note 98, at v (finding that the national taxpayer advocate is an
“advocate ombudsman” within the definition used by the ABA). For instance, even though the
Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”) in England purports not to have any regulatory authority
over the entities about which it receives complaints (private financial firms), several different
studies have found that, in practice, the FOS often exercises quasi-regulatory authority. See
Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 738–39.
102. See Bryan Camp, What Good Is the National Taxpayer Advocate?, 126 TAX NOTES
1243, 1243 (March 8, 2010).
103. Id. at 1248. There are nine criteria by which the TAS can take cases, though the first
seven are related to financial hardship. See id. They can also take cases on equity grounds
(meaning fairness issues or taxpayer rights are at stake) and on public policy grounds, although
the vast majority of these cases are hardship cases. In the first six months of 2009, the TAS
worked 101 “equity” cases and only 25 public policy cases, compared with 134,000 hardship
cases. Id.
104. Id.
105. The TAS is endowed with administrative authority in the form of Taxpayer Advocate
Directives, which authorize it to grant broad relief to taxpayers, improve operation and procedure,
and ensure equal treatment. 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation ¶ 70014 (2011). Consistent with
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an annual report to Congress containing legislative recommendations and
outlining the key shortcomings of the IRS.106 The TAS is also an active
participant in the academic community, publishing its research in law
reviews as well as in its own reports and participating in research colloquia
and conferences.107 Most importantly, the TAS relies on various informal,
“soft” approaches to influence IRS practice. As one frequent commentator
on the TAS puts it, the goal of the TAS is “to continually present the
taxpayer point of view to other subcomponents within the agency as a
balance, counterweight, or check to insular thinking and the enforcement
mentality that often pervades inquisitorial systems.”108
The TAS’s focus on counteracting regulatory inaction is evident in its
reports to Congress. For instance, the most recent report for TAS objectives
for fiscal year 2011 emphasizes IRS delays in responding to taxpayers,
issuing guidance, and incorporating into IRS materials relevant information
from recent court decisions. It criticizes the IRS’s lien-filing policies and
practices, and it questions the effectiveness of IRS initiatives to
compromise with taxpayers about their tax liability.109 Similarly, TAS’s
2009 annual report to Congress began by emphasizing the fact that the
“IRS this year acted on two longstanding issues that [the TAS has]
identified several times as most serious problems of taxpayers—identity
theft and automated levies on Social Security benefits.”110 It also
emphasized that the IRS had just announced “that it would study the
question of regulating federal return preparers and present a report to the
President and the Secretary of the Treasury before year’s end,” an initiative
this use of soft, persuasive power, the TAS has typically refrained from using its formal authority
to issue Taxpayer Advocate Directives. Nina Olson, the long-time head of TAS, explained how
the use of “taxpayer assistance orders[,] . . . the most obvious source of power[,] . . . [are] not
going to be [what] changes the system.” Camp, supra note 102, at 1254. Instead, Olson explained
that change would ultimately come from her personnel acting as “persuaders” in conjunction with
“the power of the advocate service’s annual report.” Id. For these reasons, Olson has “focused the
TAS resources on engagement and persuasion” and embraced the notion that “the best path to
change is to make the case for change.” Id.
106. See, e.g., TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1–402,
available at http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0,,id=217850,00.html.
107. See, e.g., Nina Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax
Compliance, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 7 (2009); see also TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV.,
FISCAL YEAR 2011 OBJECTIVES, at vii (2010) [hereinafter FY OBJECTIVES] (listing their many
publications since 2001 addressing various issues with IRS collection efforts).
108. Camp, supra note 102, at 1249. Olson reinforced this when she suggested in one
interview that “the taxpayer advocate service wants to be a part of all IRS initiative planning . . .
including . . . compliance initiatives, examination initiatives, planning for tax courses, and
working with task forces looking into specific issues and programs like offers in compromise.”
Id. at 1251.
109. See FY OBJECTIVES, supra note 107, at 2–20.
110. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 106, at v.
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that the TAS has “recommended . . . since [its] 2002 Annual Report to
Congress, and reiterated and supplemented . . . in successive reports.”111
The TAS’s focus on promoting IRS adaptation is also evident in its own
performance metrics. For instance, it is developing a trailing five-year
metric to track its legislative recommendations and the rate at which they
have been enacted five years later.112
In sum, the TAS uses both its significant persuasive authority––as
reflected in its direct line of communication with Congress––and its close
relationship with the IRS to directly counteract regulatory inaction and
delay. The TAS does so by putting political pressure on the IRS and by
bringing an outsider perspective to the organization. However, its role as an
ombudsman contrarian is limited to issues that involve the experiences of
“consumers” of this regulation, that is, taxpayers.
B. Consumer Representative Contrarians
A second set of contrarians represents the public within the context of
regulatory proceedings. These contrarians are intimately related to
ombudsman contrarians in that they arise out of the same intellectual
underpinnings, dating back to the 1960s and ’70s in America, which
emphasized public participation in lawmaking and the empowerment of
consumers.113 However, these contrarians are distinguishable from
ombudsman contrarians in that they either do not have a complaint-
handling function or only interact with individual members of the public as
an adjunct to their primary role of serving the public as a class. Rather,
these contrarians are empowered to represent public interests because they
serve as a “lawyer” or representative for consumers.
One example of this consumer representative contrarian is the
“Offices of Public Counsel” that are affiliated with several different state
administrative agencies. For instance, several states––including California,
Missouri, Florida, and Texas––have an Office of Public Counsel that is
affiliated with their public utilities regulators.114 Texas also has an Office of
111. See id. at iv.
112. Id. at 327–37.
113. See Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings: Hearings on S. 2715 Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1
(1976) (statement of William A. Blakey, Legislative Director, Commission on Civil Rights).
114. The Florida Office of Public Counsel “provide[s] legal representation for the people of
the state in utility related matters in proceedings before the Florida Public Service Commission,
and in proceedings before counties.” About the Office of Public Counsel, FLA. OFFICE OF PUB.
COUNSEL, http://floridaopc.gov/about.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 2011). The Florida legislature
created it by statute in 1974. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.061 (West 1998). Similarly, the
Missouri Office of the Public Counsel
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Public Insurance Counsel (“OPIC”) that was designated as an independent
agency charged with representing Texas consumers as a class regarding
insurance-related issues.115 For many of these offices, the primary (if not
sole) task is to represent consumer interests in administrative proceedings,
particularly those involving ratemaking.116 Unlike the TAS, they therefore
tend not to fulfill the role of counteracting regulatory inaction. However, at
least one public counsel, OPIC, is statutorily empowered to recommend
rule changes or legislative enactments.117 Although OPIC has used that
authority sparingly, it recently waged a prolonged and ultimately successful
campaign to ban discretionary clauses in life, health, and disability
policies.118
There are at least two potential reasons why OPIC has not done more
to promote regulatory adaptation. First, like the commissioner of the Texas
Insurance Department, the public insurance counsel, who heads OPIC, is
represents the interests of the public and utility customers in proceedings before the
Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) and in appeals in the courts. The PSC
regulates the rates and services of investor-owned electric, natural gas, telephone, water,
sewer and steam heat utilities. The Office of the Public Counsel is independent from the
PSC and has a separate budget and staff.
MO. OFFICE OF THE PUB. COUNSEL, http://www.mo-opc.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2011). The
Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel states its mission as follows:
to provide representation to Texas residential and small commercial telephone and
electric utility consumers in utility proceedings that come before the Public Utility
Commission of Texas (PUC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and in state and federal courts to ensure
that utility services are available to these ratepayers at just and reasonable rates in an
increasingly competitive environment.
About Us, TEX. OFFICE OF PUB. UTIL. COUNSEL, http://www.opc.state.tx.us/about%20us .html
(last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
115. OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNSEL, SELF-EVALUATION REPORT 3 (2007), available at
http://www.opic.state.tx.us/docs/487_sunset_self_evaluation.pdf. The Texas legislature created
the OPIC. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 501 (West 2009).
116. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. In some cases, these offices are also tasked
with improving consumer information, though they usually undertake this task independently of
any affiliated regulatory body. For instance, the Texas OPIC: (1) produces a consumer bill of
rights for personal lines of insurance; (2) develops a report card for HMOs that is made available
to the public; and (3) maintains a unique consumer information mechanism to facilitate consumer
review of individual insurers’ policy forms. OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNSEL, AGENCY STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR THE FISCAL YEARS 2011–2015 PERIOD 5 (2010), available at
http://www.opic.state.tx.us/docs/657_2010 _strategic_plan-sans_def.pdf. It performs each of
these functions entirely independently of the Texas Insurance Department. Id.
117. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 501.153 (West 2009) (granting the OPIC the power to
appear, intervene, or initiate under certain circumstances); id. § 501.155 (empowering OPIC to
recommend legislation).
118. See OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNSEL, supra note 116, at 5.
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appointed by the governor.119 As a result, these two entities are likely to
have similar views regarding insurance regulation. In any event, they have
strong political incentives not to criticize each other publicly. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, the OPIC evaluates itself based largely on
metrics that are not related to promoting regulatory adaptation. Because
their primary goal is to advocate for consumers in rate hearings,
rulemaking procedures, and other forums,120 they evaluate their success by
counting the percentage of rate and rulemaking hearings attended and the
percentage of rates and rules changed as a result of OPIC participation.121
They also measure their strategy results by counting not only the number of
such hearings attended, but also the number of proposed rule and rate
filings analyzed.122 They finally measure their efficiency by looking at the
amount spent per hearing attended.123 Whether or not these metrics properly
set priorities for OPIC, they clearly do not incentivize OPIC to focus on
promoting the Texas Insurance Department’s capacity to adapt to changing
market conditions.
Another example of consumer representative contrarians is the Funded
Consumer Liaison program of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (“NAIC”).124 Unlike most contrarians, the NAIC Consumer
Liaison program is not a single organization, but instead consists of
approximately eighteen individuals who are selected from applications
solicited from the general public on an annual basis.125 Individual consumer
liaisons are typically academics or employees of public interest
organizations, and their tenure as consumer representatives ranges from a
single year to over a decade.126 Consumer liaisons are reimbursed for the
119. Id.




124. The NAIC is the organization of state insurance regulators from all fifty states,
Washington, D.C., and the five U.S. territories. See generally Susan Randall, Insurance
Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629–34 (1999) (discussing the NAIC’s
historical development).
125. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, NAIC Accepting Applications for 2011
Consumer Liaison Representatives (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.naic.org/Releases/
2010_docs/2011_consumer_representatives.htm (announcing the NAIC’s soliciting applications
for the 2011 program); 2011 NAIC Funded Consumer Representatives, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_participation_funded _reps.pdf (last visited
Apr. 26, 2011) (listing eighteen members).
126. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, supra note 125 (indicating that the
consumer representatives consist of six academics, ten employees of nonprofit public interest
organizations, and one unaffiliated individual).
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expenses they incur in attending triannual meetings of the NAIC, are
afforded free access to NAIC resources and conference calls, and are
provided with formal training and materials.127 More importantly, consumer
liaisons are provided with privileged access to regulators and a designated
public forum for presenting on issues of their choosing at each NAIC
meeting.128
Because the NAIC consumer program is comprised of individuals
with disparate interests and expertise, its contributions to the insurance
regulatory apparatus are both more diverse and harder to characterize than
most other contrarians.129 But like the TAS, and to some extent OPIC,
consumer liaisons often focus their energies on overcoming regulatory
inaction, delay, or mistakes. For instance, one recent campaign of NAIC
consumer representatives promoted transparency in personal lines
insurance policies.130 Regulators had not addressed this issue for several
decades, in large part because it did not generate consumer complaints or
headlines. Yet NAIC consumer representatives, based both on empirical
research and their experiences in the marketplace, recognized that the issue
was pressing: in recent years, this lack of transparency has caused several
major national carriers to dramatically reduce the scope of their coverage
without consumers or regulators recognizing this fact.131 In response to
sustained pressure from NAIC consumer representatives, the NAIC is now
actively investigating comprehensive reform to improve insurance policy
transparency.132 Similarly, NAIC consumer representatives have devoted
127. See Consumer Participation at NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www
.naic.org/consumer_participation.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
128. See Committees & Activities, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/
committees_conliaison.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2011) (stating the mission of the
NAIC/Consumer Liaison Committee).
129. Consumer liaisons present on a wide range of issues at the public meetings where they
control the agenda, almost all of which advocate for specific action by regulators on a new
initiative or on an issue already before the NAIC. They similarly follow these issues of interest
across the NAIC organization, participating in conference calls, providing testimony at hearings,
supplying written testimony, and collaborating on public letters or press releases. In some cases,
representatives form themselves into organized “teams” of representatives that collaborate on
particular issues, whereas in other cases consumer liaisons fail to coordinate their activities or
even clash with one another about substantive positions and strategic priorities. Because their
participation in the consumer liaison program is not compensated and tangential to their primary
employment, the time commitment of individual consumer liaisons varies dramatically.
130. Schwarcz, supra note 33 (manuscript at 6) (describing the formation of an “Insurance
Policy Transparency Working Group” to study issues raised by personal lines insurance).
131. See generally id. (inspecting several types and carriers of insurance policies and
discussing the lack of transparency therein).
132. See Mark Ruquet, NAIC to Review Personal Lines Contract Transparency,
PROPERTYCASUALTY360° (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2010/10/
21/naic-to-review-personal-lines-contract-transparency--.
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substantial energy in recent years to encouraging regulators to scrutinize
insurers’ use of credit scores in pricing policies.133 Although the practice is
long standing, producing both confirmation bias and limited political
pressures, consumer representatives emphasized the new impacts that the
practice had in the midst of the financial crisis. In particular, they argued
that those who received subprime loans were disproportionately seeing
their credit scores decrease for reasons having little to do with their true
insurance risks.134 While it is too early to judge how these advocacy efforts
will play out, they clearly have had a substantial impact in prompting
affirmative scrutiny of a practice that otherwise would likely have been
ignored.135
Ultimately, then, existing consumer representative contrarians have
enjoyed some success in promoting regulatory adaptation to changing
market conditions. But like ombudsman contrarians, consumer
representative contrarians are limited in their subject matter to issues that
directly implicate the welfare of consumers. They are a natural means of
fighting regulatory capture and improving consumer protection regulation,
but they do less to address other forms of bias or to improve prudential or
systemic risk regulation.
C. Investigative Contrarians
The inspector general (“IG”) offices that many agencies maintain
represent a third brand of regulatory contrarian. At the federal level, IGs
became a substantial element of public agencies with the Inspector General
Act of 1978, which created IG offices in twelve federal agencies to
133. See generally CHI CHI WU & BIRNY BIRNBAUM, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT
SCORING AND INSURANCE: COSTING CONSUMERS BILLIONS AND PERPETUATING THE ECONOMIC
RACIAL DIVIDE (2007), available at http://www
.consumerlaw.org/reports/content/InsuranceScoring.pdf (calling for a ban on the use of credit
scoring in insurance, but noting that many states permit it).
134. See Phil Gusman, NAIC Presses Insurers over Credit Scoring Impact,
PROPERTYCASUALTY360° (June 15, 2009), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2009/06/
15/naic-presses-insurers-over-credit-score-impact-.
135. See id. Of course, these are just a limited number of examples where consumer
representatives have promoted more affirmative scrutiny of regulatory practices and inaction.
Another notable example is the work of several consumer representatives to more proactively
study and craft readable and comprehensible disclosures. See generally Brenda Cude, Insurance
Disclosures: An Effective Mechanism to Increase Consumers’ Market Power?, 24 J. INS. REG. 57
(2005) (studying participants’ reactions to disclosures and suggesting improvements); Brenda
Cude, Insurance Disclosures: Implications for Insurance Regulators of Recent Research, 26 J.
INS. REG. 1, 3 (2007) (reviewing briefly a few articles on the subject of improving insurance
disclosures).
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accompany two preexisting IG offices.136 Since that time, IGs have spread
throughout the federal bureaucracy, with sixty-nine agencies now having
independent IG offices.137 The primary purposes of IG offices are to detect
and prevent fraud and abuse and to promote efficiency and effectiveness in
government offices.138 In contrast to other contrarians, IGs are not intended
or designed to impact substantive agency policy. Consistent with this
orientation, IGs are ostensibly objective and nonpartisan. They are
supposedly appointed “without regard to political affiliation and solely on
the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing,
financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or
investigations.”139 Some, however, question the independence of some IG
offices,140 and the enactment of reform in 2008 was largely intended to
address concerns about the politicization of IGs’ offices.141
Inspectors general are endowed with various tools to accomplish their
prescribed goals. The most important of these tools is a broad authority to
audit and investigate its associated agency.142 IGs are also required to issue
semiannual reports to Congress reviewing deficiencies in the
administration of their agencies’ programs and operations and
recommending improvements.143 At the same time, IGs are explicitly
prohibited from interfering in the agency’s “program operating
136. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006) (creating additional IG offices);
id. § 12 (specifying the federal agencies with newly created IG offices). In 2008, the Inspector
General Reform Act amended this act, creating the Counsel of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency, which serves as a central repository for information and coordination among the
various IG offices. Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, sec. 7, § 11, 122
Stat. 4302, 4305–06 (2008) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 11 (West Supp. 2010)).
137. Marcia G. Madsen et al., Oversight—This Is Not a Commercial Relationship, in
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 2010: ENTERING INTO A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.
379, 384–85 (E. Sanderson Hoe & Marcia G. Madsen co-chairs, 2010).
138. See generally Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles, The Inspector General Act in
the Federal Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473, 474 (1985)
(stating the mission of IG offices); Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight in the Federal
Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 243 (1999) (discussing the
creation, purpose, and duties of IG offices).
139. Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model,
86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2029 (1998) (quoting relevant statutory language).
140. See generally William S. Fields & Thomas E. Robinson, Legal and Functional
Influences on the Objectivity of the Inspector General Audit Process, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L.
REV. 97 (1993) (considering factors that undermine the objectivity of certain IG offices).
141. Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, §§ 1–2, 122 Stat. 4302,
4302 (2008) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 (West Supp. 2010)) (“An Act to amend the Inspector
General Act of 1978 to enhance the independence of the Inspectors General[.]”); H.R. REP. NO.
110-354, at 8 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1795, 1796.
142. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (2006).
143. See id. § 2(3).
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responsibilities”144 or investigating issues involving “regulatory
compliance,” as opposed to the actions of their agency, its employees, and
recipients of federal funds.145 Their primary tools of audit and investigation,
along with their limited mandate, ensure that IGs’ orientation is entirely
retrospective, focusing on prior failings of internal operations within the
agency rather than potential future problems that may not have manifested
themselves.
Despite their investigative, nonpartisan, and procedural orientation,
IGs are similar to other contrarians in that they counteract regulatory
inaction and delay. This is because IGs’ authority explicitly extends to the
efficiency and effectiveness of a regulator’s internal operations. One
prominent example helps demonstrate the point. The inspector general of
the SEC released an almost 500-page report in August 2009, detailing the
agency’s various missteps in failing to act on a decade’s worth of credible,
significant evidence it had received indicating that Bernard Madoff was
operating a Ponzi scheme.146 In large part on the basis of this report, the
SEC instituted broad-ranging reforms in its operations, including, but not
limited to, “[r]evitalizing the Enforcement Division, [r]evamping the
handling of complaints and tips, [e]ncouraging greater cooperation by
‘insiders,’ [e]nhancing safeguards for investors’ assets . . . [and]
[i]mproving risk assessment capabilities.”147 Although the SEC would no
doubt have instituted reforms in the wake of the Madoff scandal, the IG
ultimately helped shape the nature and scope of those reforms by taking a
critical eye to the factors that contributed to the SEC’s failure. Similarly,
while the threat of internal investigation clearly did not prevent the SEC
from overlooking Madoff’s fraud, it can be expected that the agencies such
as the SEC overlook less given the risk of internal investigation ex post.
At the same time, some have argued that IGs are less effective than
they could be at counteracting regulatory delay and inaction because they
focus excessively on “compliance monitoring,” or strict conformity with
144. Id. § 9(a).
145. Burlington N. R.R. v. Office of Inspector Gen., R.R. Ret. Bd., 983 F.2d 631, 641 (5th
Cir. 1993); see Inspector General Authority to Conduct Regulatory Investigations, 13 OP. O.L.C.
54, 63 (1989); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Inspector General Systems, in 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 7:40 (3d ed. 2010).
146. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER
BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 47–50 (2009), available at
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/2000/2009_0831_SECMad
off.pdf (considering the causes of the SEC’s failure to discover Madoff’s illegal activities).
147. The Securities and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last modified Oct. 8, 2010).
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specific rules and regulations.148 Often, however, promoting effective
regulation also requires establishing positive incentives for achieving
desired outcomes (“performance accountability”) and promoting agency
technologies and expertise (“capacity building accountability”).149 These
criticisms may help to explain why the IG did nothing to prevent the SEC
from ignoring Madoff when intervention would have actually been useful.
Others, however, question whether IGs are better situated than other types
of entities to focus on these alternative forms of accountability.150
D. Research Contrarians
A fourth type of potential regulatory contrarian can best be labeled a
“research contrarian” in that it essentially brings “in house” various
academics or researchers who are afforded some degree of autonomy to
study issues relevant to the regulatory body. Often, potential research
contrarians do not satisfy the third element of the contrarian definition.
These contrarians produce research that is merely meant to provide
regulators with information relevant to their regulatory functions rather
than to focus on potential problems in existing regulatory processes and/or
policies.151 For instance, the NAIC maintains a Center for Insurance Policy
and Research that describes its mission as “leverag[ing] the resources of
several NAIC departments and academicians to support the collection of
information and analysis for use by state and federal officials, agencies, and
policymakers.”152 Similarly, various Federal Reserve banks maintain entire
“Economic Research Departments” that are partially intended to gather and
produce information that is used by the Federal Open Market Committee
and Board of Governors in forming national monetary policy.153
148. PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 224 (1993).
149. Id. at 220.
150. William S. Fields, The Enigma of Bureaucratic Accountability, 43 CATH. U. L. REV.
505, 518–19 (1994).
151. Entities such as the Fed’s Economic Research Departments may also fall short of the
contrarian definition in other ways. For instance, they enjoy limited mechanisms for exerting their
persuasive authority. In many ways, it seems, their primary such tool is to publish their research
in academic journals and speak at academic conferences. Although individuals within these
departments may have more substantial authority via their informal connections with top Fed
officials, the extent of this authority is hard to gauge.
152. About the CIPR, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_about .htm
(last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
153. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 10 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve .gov/pf/pdf/pf_1.pdf
(“Boards of directors of the Reserve Banks provide the Federal Reserve System with a wealth of
information on economic conditions in virtually every corner of the nation. This information is
used by the FOMC and the Board of Governors in reaching major decisions about monetary
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However, research contrarians can, and occasionally do, produce
independent research that is specifically aimed at promoting innovation and
evolution in regulation. Consider once again the Economic Research
Departments of Federal Reserve banks. Economists in these departments
have produced a substantial amount of research in recent years studying
ways to reform systemic risk regulation. For example, one recent paper
produced in such a department proposes the construction of a database that
monitors fund flows and financial instruments to get a more accurate
picture of systemic risk, allowing vulnerabilities to be spotted far sooner.154
Other research originating in these departments focuses on potentially
unaddressed but problematic market practices, such as whether certain
commission programs offered to bank employees tended to increase default
rates.155 Yet another paper analyzes popular models used by the Federal
Reserve in predicting wage and inflationary pressures and finds that the
models are inaccurate because they don’t incorporate the ways in which the
Federal Reserve’s economic and policy changes themselves impact wages
and prices.156 Thus, research contrarians within the Fed clearly do focus on
promoting regulatory adaptation to changing market conditions. Much less
information is available about what mechanisms exist for them to persuade
Fed regulators to act upon their research findings.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, in particular, illustrates
both the potential for research contrarians to promote agency adaptation
and the difficulties of designing successful contrarian strategies. The
Minneapolis Fed was one of the first regional Federal Reserve banks to
policy.”); About Economic Research, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL.,
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/about.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2011) (“The Dallas Fed’s
Economic Research Department provides information and analysis to the Board of Governors, the
Bank’s president and the board of directors to assist them in implementing effective monetary
policy. . . . Providing timely, insightful analysis of current economic conditions is the
department’s primary goal.”).
154. Leonard Nakamura, Durable Financial Regulation: Monitoring Financial Instruments as
a Counterpart to Regulating Financial Institutions 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Research
Dep’t, Working Paper No. 10-22, 2010), available at http://www .philadelphiafed.org/research-
and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wp10-22.pdf (“I here advocate a system for
monitoring financial instruments as a complement to the regulation of financial institutions. If a
system of financial regulation is to be durable, it must evolve with the development of new
institutions and instruments. A main purpose of this paper is to begin a dialogue on an intellectual
framework for the analysis of systemic risk data collection.”).
155. Sumit Agarwal & Faye H. Wang, Perverse Incentives at the Banks? Evidence from a
Natural Experiment 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 09-08, 2009), available at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedhwp/wp-09-08.html.
156. Benjamin D. Keen & Evan F. Koenig, How Robust Are Popular Models of Nominal
Frictions? 22–23 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall. Econ. Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. 0903,
2009), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/papers/2009/wp 0903.pdf.
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build a serious research department. Working with the University of
Minnesota economics department, the Minneapolis Fed played a major role
in developing the rational expectations approach to macroeconomics.157
This approach contained major intellectual breakthroughs and, with its
promarket tendencies, served as a useful counter to the proregulation
tendencies that characterized the Keynesianism that dominated both
academia and policy in the 1960s. It helped promote financial market
deregulation at a time when regulation may well have gone too far.
However, it continued to promote deregulation after that movement may
well itself have gone too far. The strong free-market culture of the
Minneapolis Fed and the Minnesota economics department was self-
reinforcing and drew upon strong forces in the DNA of economics as an
intellectual discipline.158 However, when views that had once been
contrarian become intellectually and politically dominant, this particular
agency entity was not able to reverse course and start criticizing the very
ideas that it helped nurture.159 Thus, while research contrarians provide a
promising avenue for addressing some of the forms of regulatory bias
identified here, and especially for addressing problems in regulating
systemic risk, they are far from a panacea.
E. Quasi-contrarians
A quasi-contrarian is simply an entity that resembles a contrarian but
does not meet one of the formal elements of the definition that we lay out
above. The most obvious, and most important, example of a quasi-
contrarian is the GAO. The GAO describes itself as an “independent,
nonpartisan agency that works for Congress” to “investigate[] how the
federal government spends taxpayer dollars.”160 The GAO ensures that
federal funds are being spent efficiently and effectively, investigates
allegations of illegal and improper activities, reports on how well
157. See PRESTON J. MILLER, THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS REVOLUTION: READINGS FROM
THE FRONT LINE, at xv (1994).
158. For an interesting online debate between the new president of the Minneapolis Federal
Reserve, a “freshwater” economist who did research for the Fed for years before becoming its
president, and Brad Delong, a prominent “saltwater” Keynesian economist, see Bradford DeLong,
The State of Modern Cutting Edge Macro: Narayana Kocherlakota Leaves Me Puzzled, BRAD
DELONG’S GRASPING REALITY WITH BOTH HANDS (Sept. 20, 2009, 12:13 PM),
http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/09/the-state-of-modern-cutting-edge-macro-narayana-
kocherlakota-leaves-me-puzzled.html.
159. See Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 41, at 827–28 (arguing that the idea of the “great
moderation” became so dominant in the Fed that “it is unlikely that anyone in the Fed’s research
department would have taken issue with the concept”).
160. About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/about
/index.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
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government programs and policies are meeting their objectives, performs
policy analyses, and outlines options for congressional consideration.161
Although the GAO resembles a contrarian, it does not meet the definition
of a contrarian because it is not affiliated with a specific regulatory entity.
Rather, the GAO was put under the control of Congress in 1946.162
The GAO is, of course, an immensely valuable organization. But its
capacity to counteract regulatory inaction and delay may be limited by its
generalist orientation and formal relationship to Congress rather than a
specific agency. Although it is authorized to evaluate regulatory programs
on its own initiatives,163 this proactive type of activity has gradually been
supplanted in recent years by the GAO’s increasing focus on responding to
Congressional requests or statutory mandates.164 This orientation may limit
the GAO’s capacity to identify and counteract agency inaction in the face
of market change.165
Similar arguments can be made about OIRA, another quasi-contrarian
that is not affiliated with any particular agency and that enjoys substantial
regulatory authority. OIRA’s broad mandate arguably limits its capacity to
promote proactive regulation in specific agencies.166 It may also undermine
the subject-matter expertise of individual agencies.167 Others have argued
that the scope of OIRA’s authority produces enhanced risk of regulatory
161. Id.
162. See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 136, 60 Stat. 812, 832
(repealed 1979).
163. 31 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2006).
164. In fiscal year 1999, 95% of the GAO’s work was the result of congressional requests
(72%) or mandates (23%). Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2371 n.262 (2006). This trend has continued—in fiscal year
2009, 95% of the GAO’s engagement resources were devoted to work requested or mandated by
Congress. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-234SP, PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 16 (2009).
165. At the same time, though, the breadth of the requests to which the GAO responds may,
in fact, allow it to counteract regulatory inaction. For example, the GAO appears to have made a
number of recommendations that may have helped to avert the recent financial crisis, at least to
some extent. Between 2004 and 2007, the GAO issued four different reports criticizing the
overlapping authority of the four agencies regulating financial institutions and the potential this
created for gaps in regulatory oversight. RICHARD J. HILLMAN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-09-1049T, RECENT CRISIS REAFFIRMS THE NEED TO OVERHAUL THE U.S.
REGULATORY SYSTEM 7–8 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d091049t.pdf.
166. See Farber, supra note 75, at 1399–1402 (establishing the failure to be proactive).
167. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 281 (1991); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential
Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 97 (2006).
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capture.168 This contrasts with the point made above that true contrarians
may face more limited threat of capture precisely because they enjoy
limited authority.169
IV. THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY CONTRARIANS AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION
Parts II and III suggest that regulatory contrarians can, and
occasionally do, modestly promote regulatory adaptation to market change.
At the same time, they suggest that existing contrarians remain quite
limited in important ways. Ombudsmen and consumer representatives are
limited to the consumer protection function, while investigative and
research contrarians are limited through their methodological emphases or
limits on their authority. As a result, contrarians have historically had little
influence on important segments of financial regulation. Perhaps most
importantly, their substantive and methodological limitations mean that
they have not generally operated in the domain of prudential and systemic
risk.170
This Part transitions from the history of regulatory contrarians to their
future. Dodd-Frank171 is the largest and most comprehensive reform of the
American system of financial regulation since the New Deal. The Act
broadly embraces and expands upon regulatory contrarians in financial
regulation. It creates a number of new contrarian institutions within many
federal agencies, enhances some existing contrarian institutions, and
contains various quasi-contrarian elements. These changes expand
regulatory contrarians squarely into the domain of systemic and prudential
risk regulation. They also broaden some of the methodological restrictions
of contrarians, directing “investigative” contrarians to be more proactive
and “academic” contrarians to be more policy oriented. Interestingly, at
least one newly minted financial regulatory contrarian arose outside of
Dodd-Frank, on the initiative of the SEC.
Not only are contrarians a pervasive feature of financial reform, but
their effectiveness is critical for the success of reform writ large. As alluded
168. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 14, at 1306–08 (arguing that OIRA is just as subject to
regulatory capture as are ordinary agencies, and perhaps even more so); Barkow, supra note 10,
at 34–37.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90.
170. The financial crisis reveals that some forms of consumer abuse may increase systemic
risk. For that reason, stronger consumer protection may address systemic risk. See generally Cox,
supra note 7, at 279 (arguing that if consumer advocates’ and regulators’ warnings were heeded,
then the subprime mortgage crisis might have been avoided).
171. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2011)).
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to at the outset of this Article, a central goal of financial reform is to make
financial regulation more adaptive to market changes impacting both
systemic risk and consumer protection threats. In other words, it attempts to
create a framework that does not simply address the particular causes of the
past crisis, but that encourages agencies to anticipate future consumer
protection and systemic risks. Because financial reform is a response to a
deep financial crisis, the politics that temporarily made possible increased
financial regulation are not likely to last, even though most of the details of
reform will ultimately be spelled out by regulators in the coming years.
Moreover, the Act tackles almost all of the major interest groups within the
financial system and thus faces all the public choice problems that entails.
In short, as an attempt at comprehensive reform of financial regulation in
the face of the greatest financial crisis in the lifetime of most living
Americans, it faces all of the obstacles we have identified (and then some).
Section A of this Part describes the various regulatory contrarian and
quasi-contrarian tools that Dodd-Frank and associated financial reforms
embrace in an effort to devise more adaptive financial regulation. Section B
then offers some preliminary thoughts on the lessons that long-standing
regulatory contrarians provide for the new generation of contrarians
emerging out of financial reform.
A. Regulatory Contrarians in Financial Reform
Dodd-Frank establishes several new offices that meet our definition of
a regulatory contrarian. First, the Act establishes several new contrarians
that straddle the line between research contrarians and investigative
contrarians. The most important of these may be the Office of Financial
Research (“OFR”).172 This office, established as an independent entity
within the Treasury Department, does not enjoy any rulemaking authority
but is instead charged with identifying potential sources of systemic risk for
the benefit of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (which is discussed
more fully below).173 The OFR thus extends contrarians’ role firmly into
the domain of systemic risk regulation. Like classical investigative
contrarians, the OFR enjoys wide-ranging authority to collect data. It can
explicitly collect data from financial companies.174 While the Act does not
give the OFR explicit authority to collect data from other agencies, it does
have authority to standardize the data that they collect and report to the
Financial Stability Oversight Council, which itself has clear authority to
172. § 152(a), 124 Stat. at 1413 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5342(a)).
173. § 153(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1415 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5343(c)(1)).
174. § 154(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1416–17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5344(b)(1)(B)).
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collect information from agencies.175 Despite this investigative power, its
methodological orientation is more like classical research contrarians: it is
directed to identify sources of systemic risk, promote research on systemic
risk, and evaluate the health of the regulated marketplace.176 Indeed, its
creation was championed by an academic, John Liechty at Pennsylvania
State University, who saw that federal financial regulators’ data could be
mined using modern computer and analytical techniques to identify sources
of systemic risk.177
The new Federal Insurance Office178 is another research contrarian that
enjoys some features of an investigative contrarian. The primary role of the
Federal Insurance Office is “to monitor all aspects of the insurance
industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers
that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry or the
United States financial system.”179 Not only does this mission further rely
on contrarians to identify systemic risk, but it also creates a federal
contrarian that is designed to influence the state-based regulatory system.
Like the OFR, the Federal Insurance Office enjoys broad data-gathering
powers traditionally associated with investigative contrarians. In particular,
it is authorized to require any insurer to submit virtually any data that it
determines is relevant to its mission.180 Its regulatory functions are limited
to a number of narrow domains, such as assisting the Treasury Department
in administering the Terrorism Insurance Program, coordinating federal
175. § 153(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1415 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5343(c)(2)); § 112(a)(2)(A),
124 Stat. at 1395 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a)(2)(A)).
176. The Research and Analysis Center of the Office is charged
(B) to monitor, investigate, and report on changes in systemwide risk levels and patterns
to the Council and Congress; (C) to conduct, coordinate, and sponsor research to support
and improve regulation of financial entities and markets; (D) to evaluate and report on
stress tests or other stability-related evaluations of financial entities overseen by the
member agencies . . . (G) to conduct studies and provide advice on the impact of policies
related to systemic risk; and (H) to promote best practices for financial risk management.
§ 154(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1417–18 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5344(c)(1)).
177. Carrick Mollenkamp, How a Street Watchdog Got Its Bite, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2010,
at C1. Bankers at Morgan Stanley also helped push for the OFR. Id. For some biographical
information on Liechty, see Directory: John Liechty, PA. STATE UNIV. SMEAL COLL. OF BUS.,
http://php.smeal.psu.edu/smeal/dirbio/displayBio.php?t_user_id =jcl12 (last visited Apr. 26,
2011).
178. Sec. 502(a), § 313(a), 124 Stat. at 1580 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 313(a)).
179. Id.
180. Sec. 502(a), § 313(e)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1581–82 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 313(e)(2)(A)).
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efforts to develop international insurance policy, and determining whether
state insurance measures are preempted by international agreements.181
The new Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation
(“Division”) in the SEC is yet another new research contrarian, though it
was created by the SEC itself rather than Dodd-Frank. According to the
press release announcing the Division, it is designed to “provide the
Commission with sophisticated analysis that integrates economic, financial,
and legal disciplines” with a focus on “three broad areas: risk and
economic analysis; strategic research; and financial innovation.”182 The
initial director of the new Division was Henry Hu, a well-known finance
professor who warned of potential risks from derivatives many years before
the crisis.183 Hu, who recently stepped down after setting up the Division,
was brought in to help the SEC “really rethink risk management and help
[the SEC] attract different skill sets to the agency as we try to remake the
organization.”184
The Act also extends the reach of contrarians by expanding the role of
classical investigative contrarians. As noted in Part III, all of the major
financial regulatory agencies already had their own IG offices. But Dodd-
Frank importantly expands the role of these contrarians, creating a Council
of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight composed of the inspectors
general of the major financial regulatory agencies.185 As above, this
contrarian organization is charged with examining sources of systemic risk,
a significant step away from the traditional focus of IG offices on fraud and
inefficiency. The Council of Inspectors General will meet at least quarterly,
“with a focus on concerns that may apply to the broader financial sector
and ways to improve financial oversight.”186 It must report on its findings
annually to Congress and to the Financial Stability Oversight Council.187
Dodd-Frank also expands the reach of investigative contrarians into
several self-regulatory bodies. First, the Act not only established privately
organized derivatives-clearing organizations that will be closely overseen
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) or the SEC,188
181. Sec. 502(a), § 313(c)(1)(D)–(F), 124 Stat. at 1580–81 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 313(c)(1)(D)–(F)).
182. Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces New Division of Risk, Strategy,
and Financial Innovation (Sept. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2009/2009-199.htm.
183. Id.
184. Kara Scannell, At SEC, Scholar Who Saw It Coming, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2010, at C1.
185. § 989E(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1946 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 11).
186. § 989E(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1946 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 11).
187. § 989E(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1946–47 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 11).
188. Sec. 725(b), § 5b(g), 124 Stat. at 1686 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-1(g)).
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but it requires these organizations to have chief compliance officers that
operate as investigative contrarians.189 These officers are required to review
the organization’s compliance with soundness principles set forth in the
Act, resolve conflicts of interest, establish procedures for remediating
noncompliance, and prepare annual reports to the CFTC or SEC concerning
regulatory compliance.190 Second, the Act requires credit rating agencies to
have compliance officers who submit reports to the SEC on the
organization’s compliance with the securities laws.191 Like classical
ombudsmen, however, these investigative contrarians must handle
complaints regarding the organization.
Although Dodd-Frank’s central strategy for promoting consumer
protection is through its establishment of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Act relies on consumer representative
contrarians as well. For instance, the Act establishes an Investor Advisory
Committee within the SEC that is composed of the investor advocate
(described below), representatives of state securities commissions,
representatives of senior citizens, and ten to twenty members appointed to
represent individual and institutional investors.192 The committee is directed
to advise and consult the SEC on protecting investor interests, promoting
investor confidence, and ensuring the integrity of the marketplace.193 Like
consumer representative contrarians generally, the committee thus gives
voice to outside representatives of investors within the agency. Similarly,
the CFPB itself contains a Consumer Advisory Board composed of outside
consumer interest advocates.194 Note that these consumer representative
contrarians work within agencies that are themselves created to protect
certain consumers and investors. Various regulatory obstacles––particularly
capture––threaten to divert the agency from that protective function, and
the contrarians are intended to keep the agencies focused on their intended
goals.195
189. Sec. 725(b), § 5b(i), 124 Stat. at 1686–87 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-1(i)).
190. Sec. 725(b), § 5b(i)(3), 124 Stat. at 1687 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-1(i)(3)).
191. § 932(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1872–73 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(c)).
192. Sec. 911, § 39(b), 124 Stat. at 1822–23 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78pp(b)).
193. Sec. 911, § 39(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1822 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78pp(a)(2)).
194. § 1014(b), 124 Stat. at 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5494(b)).
195. Also worth noting in the role of consumer representative contrarians are the Offices of
Minority and Women Inclusion that are created within each financial regulatory agency.
§ 342(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1541 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5452(a)(1)(A)). These offices shall
assess how agency policies and programs affect women and minorities. § 342(b)(2), 124 Stat. at
1541 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5452(b)(2)).
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Dodd-Frank also establishes some new ombudsman contrarians. First,
it creates an Office of the Investor Advocate within the SEC.196 The new
office is charged with assisting investors in resolving problems they have
with the SEC, identifying areas in which investors would benefit from rule
changes, and analyzing the impact of proposed rules.197 The investor
advocate cannot otherwise be employed by the SEC for two years before or
five years after serving in that position.198 The investor advocate largely
parallels the TAS in the IRS, another ombudsman contrarian: both charge
agency employees who regularly field investor complaints to look after the
interests of those investors by making recommendations without
themselves setting rules. Interestingly, the SEC investor advocate will
appoint a specific ombudsman who will help retail investors resolve
problems with the SEC and review procedures to encourage persons to
present questions to the investor advocate.199 The Act also creates a Private
Education Loan Ombudsman within the new CFPB.200 This office will
receive and attempt to resolve complaints from education loan borrowers
and make recommendations to the relevant regulators.201
We thus see examples of all four categories of contrarians either
newly created or strengthened within Dodd-Frank. Many of these
contrarians blur some of the traditional contrarian categories described in
Part III, and the majority of them focus on systemic risk, an area far afield
from the traditional domain of contrarians.
The Act also includes several quasi-contrarian measures: protecting
whistleblowers is one such measure. Insiders, both within agencies and
within regulated businesses, often have crucial information that, if known
to regulators, would help guide them. Encouraging them to make such
information public is an important way to get more information to
regulatory agencies. Dodd-Frank provides for awards to whistleblowers
who provide original information concerning securities law violations.202
The Act also forbids employers from retaliating against such
whistleblowers.203 More interestingly and originally, the Act creates a
hotline for SEC employees to suggest improvements or report
196. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(1), 124 Stat. at 1830 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(g)(1)).
197. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(4), 124 Stat. at 1831 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(g)(4)).
198. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1831 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(g)(2)(C)).
199. Sec. 919D, § 4(g)(8)(B)(ii), 124 Stat. at 1840 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78d(g)(8)(B)(ii)).
200. § 1035(a), 124 Stat. at 2009 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5535(a)).
201. § 1035(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2010 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5535(c)(1)).
202. Sec. 922(a), § 21F(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1)).
203. Sec. 922(a), § 21F(h)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1845–46 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)).
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mismanagement.204 The hotline will be maintained by an old contrarian: the
SEC’s inspector general.205
Another new quasi-contrarian institution, noted above, is the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”). The FSOC is composed of the
heads of the major federal financial regulatory agencies.206 It includes as
nonvoting members the directors of the OFR and the Federal Insurance
Office.207 The FSOC must meet at least quarterly and is charged with
considering potential threats to financial stability.208 This is not a separate
contrarian body, but instead consists of the heads of regulatory agencies. It
does, however, force those agency heads to meet regularly to consider
possible problems with the existing regulatory system. They will be able to
pool information and compare their varying perspectives. This will bring
together persons with some diversity of perspective209 in a setting where
they are charged with considering threats to stability. The Act builds in
several mechanisms to prod the FSOC to do this job effectively. The FSOC
must report regularly to Congress.210 The GAO will regularly audit the
FSOC,211 and the FSOC includes various contrarians as nonvoting
members.212
In sum, the Dodd-Frank Act uses contrarian and quasi-contrarian
institutions widely. We cannot think of another piece of federal legislation
that uses such techniques so pervasively. The new contrarian entities can be
slotted within the four existing categories identified in this Article.
However, they push the existing bounds of those categories beyond their
current limits. There is a much greater focus on systemic risk than seen
before, with one entire entity (the OFR) focused on it and others enlisted in
the fight. IG offices are given a substantive role that they have not had
before. Research contrarians are given authority they have not previously
enjoyed and more specific, policy-oriented missions. Quasi-contrarian
strategies, such as those involving the FSOC that combine with old
contrarians like the inspectors general and new contrarians like the OFR
204. Sec. 966, § 4D(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1912 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d-4(a)(1)).
205. Id.
206. § 111(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1392–93 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321(b)(1)).
207. § 111(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1393 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321(b)(2)).
208. § 111(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 1394 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321(e)(1)); § 112(a)(1), 124
Stat. at 1394 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a)(1)).
209. For instance, the director of the CFPB is likely to have a more proconsumer perspective
than most other FSOC members.
210. § 112(a)(2)(N), 124 Stat. at 1396 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a)(2)(N)).
211. § 122(a), 124 Stat. at 1411 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5332(a)).
212. § 111(b)(2)(A)–(B), 124 Stat. at 1393 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321(b)(2)(A)–(B))
(listing the director of the OFR and director of the Federal Insurance Office as nonvoting
members of the FSOC).
MCDONNELL&SCHWARCZ.PTD 6/13/2011 2:05 PM
2011] REGULATORY CONTRARIANS 1673
and the Federal Insurance Office, push agencies yet further. These new
entities and strategies will surely not be a cure-all for the pervasive
problems they address. Cognitive biases, capture, agency aggrandizement,
and ossification will be widely present as the Act is implemented over time.
But one hopes that the new institutions and strategies identified here will
significantly reduce these problems. The next section considers various
lessons that can be gleaned from past contrarians to help increase the
chances of this outcome.
B. Preliminary Lessons for Future Regulatory Contrarians
Long-standing regulatory contrarians offer a broad range of potential
insights for the new generation of contrarians created in the wake of
financial reform. First, the experience of the Minneapolis Fed research
contrarian offers some potential insights on how to structure regulatory
contrarians so that they maintain a contrarian orientation in the long run.
Recall that this institution seemingly adopted a contrarian orientation when
it was first developed that helped to nudge federal banking policy away
from excessive regulation. Unfortunately, this substantive, deregulatory
position became a defining feature of the Minneapolis Fed, leading it to
maintain this perspective well past the point when it was a minority
viewpoint within the Fed. The contrarian thus ultimately ended up as more
of a cheerleader for the deregulatory policies of the Federal Reserve under
Alan Greenspan than as a skeptical, contrarian institution. This risk seems
particularly grave for research contrarians because their contrarian
orientation is neither tethered to a particular constituency nor inherently
apolitical (as is arguably true with investigative contrarians).
Research contrarians such as the OFR; the Federal Insurance Office;
and the SEC’s Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation may be
able to avoid a similar fate by changing their leadership whenever the
leadership of their associated regulatory entity changes. Of course, the goal
would be for the new leadership of the research contrarian to have different
perspectives than the new leadership of the affiliated agency, so this would
only make sense if there were a way to allow the losing political party to
select the contrarian leadership. Approaches such as that employed in
Texas, where the governor appoints both the head of OPIC and the
commissioner of the Insurance Department, should thus be avoided.213
Replacing the leadership of research contrarians on a periodic basis, or
simply infusing research contrarians with staff or visitors from divergent
methodological and philosophical perspectives, are two sensible, less
213. See OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNSEL, supra note 116, at 5, 16.
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radical plans. Alternatively, some new contrarians might follow the model
of the NAIC Consumer Liaison program, soliciting applications from the
public for time-bound positions that afford them substantial autonomy in
pushing their own particularized contrarian perspective.214
A second lesson for the new generation of financial regulatory
contrarians concerns the use of performance metrics. If feasible, well-
designed performance metrics not only improve agency accountability, but
they also shape the objectives of the organization being evaluated.215
Developing such metrics may be difficult for contrarians, however, because
while their outputs, such as audits or reports, are measurable, their progress
in promoting regulatory adaptation is likely difficult to measure and
controlled predominantly by their affiliated agency.216 Some contrarians,
such as OPIC,217 consequently resort to performance metrics that are easy
to track and meet, but fail to develop “measurable goals for the results or
outcomes that their programs are intended to achieve.”218 Poorly designed
metrics like these can create perverse incentives. The GAO faced this
problem in the late 1990s, when its performance metrics were process
oriented, not outcome oriented, measuring easy-to-count items such as the
number of reports issued or the number of hearings attended.219 They
responded by developing several new outcome-oriented performance
metrics, including the number of recommendations made, the percentage of
214. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
215. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-1167T, TRANSFORMATION,
CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES: STATEMENT OF DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE U.S. 8–9 (2003) [hereinafter WALKER], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031167t.pdf (“Measuring the right things is vitally important
because you manage what you measure and measurements ultimately drive basic organizational
and individual behaviors.”); Ken S. Cavalluzzo & Christopher D. Ittner, Implementing
Performance Measurement Innovations: Evidence from Government, 29 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y
243, 259–60 (2004) (studying the statistically significant correlation between performance
measurement development and the accountability of government agencies).
216. This is particularly true for ombudsman contrarians, who handle consumer complaints
but depend upon their affiliated agency to address underlying causes of those complaints, and
research contrarians, who lack the authority to implement any of their suggestions. See BERYL A.
RADIN, CHALLENGING THE PERFORMANCE MOVEMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY, COMPLEXITY, AND
DEMOCRATIC VALUES 42–44 (2006) (discussing the difficulties faced in designing performance
metrics by agencies that either cannot measure or do not control the outcomes of their efforts).
217. See supra Part III.B.
218. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GGD-99-16, MANAGING FOR RESULTS:
MEASURING PROGRAM RESULTS THAT ARE UNDER LIMITED FEDERAL CONTROL 1 (1998); see
also Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1760 (2008) (describing the tendency among federal agencies to design
performance metrics comprised of “a set of optimistic statistics designed to reassure the agency’s
overseers that they are doing fine, rather than a frank discussion of the real causes of regulatory
failure”).
219. See WALKER, supra note 215, at 9.
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reports with recommendations, and the percentage of its recommendations
made four years ago that had been implemented.220
These metrics encourage contrarians to focus both on making realistic
recommendations and on aggressively lobbying to have those
recommendations implemented. This has certainly been the case for the
GAO. In 1998, 69% of recommendations from 1994 had been
implemented, while only 33% of written products issued in 1998 contained
recommendations.221 These numbers have steadily improved, and in 2008,
83% of recommendations from four years ago had been implemented, and
66% of new written products contained recommendations.222 The TAS has
adopted similar metrics, and it too has seemingly enjoyed substantial
success in promoting IRS adaptation in recent years.223 However, even
these more sophisticated metrics could have perverse incentives. For
instance, they may encourage a contrarian to make a large number of small
and uncontroversial recommendations rather than recommendations that
are likely to face serious resistance, but are more important and valuable.
So, using performance metrics is worth considering, but only with very
careful deliberation. It may be that performance metrics are more
appropriate for some contrarians than others—they may work better for
consumer representatives, for instance, than for research contrarians
focused on complex problems surrounding systemic risk.
A third lesson for future contrarians is the importance of using a
combination of formal and “soft” approaches to influence the underlying
regulator. As recounted earlier, the TAS has utilized these different types of
persuasive elements to great success in the recent past.224 By involving its
own personnel with daily regulatory activities, it has developed both
legitimacy within the IRS as well as a deep appreciation of the difficulties
facing the IRS. At the same time, the TAS has strategically used the power
220. Id. at 8–9.
221. Id. at 11.
222. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-234SP, PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 23, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10234sp.pdf. The fact that thirty-four percent of new products did not contain
recommendations demonstrates that while performance metrics can be valuable, they have
limitations; regulatory contrarians should recognize where statistical achievements may
undermine their core mission. “[W]e set our target [for the percentage of new products containing
recommendations] again in fiscal year 2010 at 60 percent because we recognize that our products
do not always include recommendations and that the Congress and agencies often find
informational reports just as useful as those that contain recommendations.” Id. at 32.
223. The TAS, an ombudsman organization, will begin in 2011 to measure the percentage on
recommendations from four years ago that have been implemented. See FY OBJECTIVES, supra
note 107, at VI-3.
224. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
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of its formal reports to Congress in combination with this soft power to
push otherwise difficult reforms at the IRS.
A final lesson concerns how to preserve the contrarian’s independence
from its affiliated agency. Because of a contrarian’s role in studying,
investigating, or criticizing an affiliated executive agency, independence
from that agency is essential to a contrarian’s proper functioning.225 Even
the appearance that a contrarian is under the influence or control of its
affiliated executive agency may undermine its power to persuade and thus
its effectiveness.226 There are a number of ways a contrarian’s
independence can be threatened. Some of these include the appointment
process for the director, the ability to remove that director, control over the
contrarian’s budget, lack of an independent staff or legal counsel, and a
unique form of agency capture, whereby the contrarian’s employees come
from the ranks of the affiliated agency.227
Existing contrarians offer various potential lessons for how best to
safeguard the independence of the new generation of contrarians. For
instance, as noted earlier, one of the primary goals of the Inspector General
Reform Act of 2008 was to enhance the independence of IGs. Some of the
mechanisms it relies upon to accomplish this include requiring prior written
explanations to Congress regarding the removal or transfer of an IG,
facilitating IG access to independent legal advice, and establishing a
Council of Inspectors General that itself polices the independence of IGs.228
225. See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 109
(2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/09_tas_arc_vol_2.pdf (explaining that “[a]n
ombudsman must be free from bias or conflicts of interest . . . . At a minimum, the ombudsman
should be independent from management or other administrative obligations or functions because
the more an ombudsman must rely on his or her parent organization, the more difficult it is to
operate impartially”); Fields & Robinson, supra note 140, at 108 (arguing that “independence and
objectivity . . . are central to the Inspector Generals’ role in that they bear directly upon the
Inspector Generals’ ability to produce results that are both reliable and relevant to decision
makers”).
226. See FREDERICK M. KAISER, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AND GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RL 30349, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 12, 15 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30349.pdf (discussing the GAO’s view that “independence
from regulation by executive branch entities . . . was seen as necessary to remove even the
appearance of a conflict of interest, as GAO had increased oversight of these agencies and the
federal personnel system”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 225, at 112–14 (describing various ways
that an ombudsman agency can be compromised by its affiliated agency); see also AM. BAR
ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS OFFICES 2–4
(2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
leadership/2004/dj/115.authcheckdam.pdf (outlining the requirements for effective ombuds
operation).
228. Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, sec. 7(a), § 11(a), 122 Stat.
4302, 4306 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 3 (West Supp. 2010)); sec. 6(a), § 3(g), 122 Stat. at
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Similarly, the TAS’s independence was buttressed with the Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998, which provided that the national taxpayer
advocate reports only to the IRS commissioner and cannot have worked for
the IRS for two years before appointment. Under the statute, the TAS itself
is to be separate from the IRS with respect to management control,
facilities, and career opportunities.229
To be sure, some of these lessons appear to have already influenced
the structure of the next generation of contrarians created by Dodd-Frank.
For instance, Dodd-Frank occasionally prevents executive agencies from
interfering with a contrarian by removing its director,230 changing its
duties,231 cutting its budget,232 reviewing its reports to Congress,233 or
controlling its hiring or firing.234 But these protections appear to be lacking
in some cases. For example, while independent budgets were provided for
the OFR235 and the CFPB,236 there is no such provision for the Office of the
Investor Advocate.237 These limitations have already hindered the progress
of contrarians, with the SEC recently announcing that it is indefinitely
delaying the creation and staffing of both the Office of Investor Advocate
and the Whistleblower Office due to “budget uncertainty.”238 Also
concerning is the lack of protections against director removal. This could
be a particular problem where the contrarian’s director reports directly to
the head of the affiliated agency, such as the investor advocate, who is
appointed by, and reports directly to, the chairman of the SEC.239 As the
4305 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 3); sec. 3(a), § 3(b), 122 Stat. at 4302 (codified at 5
U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 3); H.R. REP. NO. 110-354, at 8 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1795,
1796.
229. See Camp, supra note 102, at 1248.
230. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 152(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1413 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5342(b)(1) (West Supp. 2011))
(stating that the director of the OFR is to be appointed by the president).
231. § 152(b)(5), 124 Stat. at 1413 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5342(b)(5)).
232. § 155, 124 Stat. at 1418–19 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5345); § 1017(a)(2), 124 Stat. at
1975–76 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5497(a)(2)).
233. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(6)(B)(iii), 124 Stat. at 1832 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 78d(g)(6)(B)(iii)).
234. § 152(d), 124 Stat. at 1413–14 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5342(d)); see, e.g., Lubbers,
supra note 98 (manuscript at 61–64) (reviewing the various provisions that give the TAS a high
degree of independence); KAISER, supra note 226, at 23 (outlining the protections afforded the
comptroller general of the GAO against removal from office).
235. See § 155(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1419 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5345(b)(1)).
236. See § 1017(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1975 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5497(a)(2)(C)).
237. See § 915, 124 Stat. at 1830–32 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 78d).
238. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—
Dates To Be Determined, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.sec
.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dates_to_be_determined.shtml.
239. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1830–31 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(g)(2)(A)).
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new contrarians grow and evolve, the lessons learned from existing
contrarians should be used to buttress structural independence from
affiliated agencies.
CONCLUSION
Would all of these contrarians in Dodd-Frank have prevented the
financial crisis from occurring? We doubt it, but that is in part because we
fight the hypothetical—creating such contrarians would have gone against
the very trends that led to the crisis. This financial crisis occurred after the
longest period of relative financial peace in American history. The last
great financial crisis in the United States was the Great Depression. The
1970s had some turbulence, but no full-blown crisis, and the ’80s had the
savings and loan fiasco, but that affected a much more limited part of the
financial system. Such relative peace for so long is bound to eventually
lead to both private actors and regulators letting down their guard.240 Few
saw the need for contrarians. Even if they had been in place, eventually
they would have become Cassandras impotently decrying the excessive
move to deregulation.
Now that a crisis has occurred, we are more attuned to the need for
such contrarians. If we institutionalize them, there is a chance that they
may delay the next crisis and help lessen its severity when it does arrive.
We have seen the large number of contrarian and quasi-contrarian entities
and strategies that the Dodd-Frank Act creates or strengthens. Some of
these are quite narrow and focused, while others are broader. Some focus
on consumer or investor protection, while others focus on systemic risk.
The sheer number and variety of new entities provide many different paths
for those concerned about emerging risks to make themselves heard. We
think there is quite a good chance that as new financial risks emerge,
someone somewhere within the various financial regulatory agencies will
sound an alarm. The chances of that occurring are even greater to the extent
that some of the new contrarians, especially research contrarians such as
the Office of Financial Research or the Division of Risk, Strategy, and
Financial Innovation (not a part of Dodd-Frank, but also a response to the
crisis), adopt a model of broad academic inquiry and debate that brings in
scholars and others with a wide range of views to discuss questions with
the agencies and regulators.
The much harder question is whether those raising the right alarms
will manage to get the appropriate regulators to listen and act on their
240. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 5, 68, 176, 219–20, 270
(1986); McDonnell, supra note 22, at 38.
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concerns. Only time will answer that question. Surely the answer in part
will be that some on-target alarms will be ignored. When the next crisis
does hit, there will be stories of people within some of the contrarian
entities discussed here who identified some problem that helped cause the
new crisis, but who were unable to get their regulators to listen and act on
their warnings. But with some luck, hard work, and wisdom, it may also be
that some contrarians do identify real problems and manage to get
regulators to act to address them. These probably will not generate as many
stories—crises averted are less salient than crises that occur after warnings
that fall on deaf ears. Cassandras ignored and vindicated will cry out, “I
told you so,” while Cassandras heeded will often generate people annoyed
by the regulations they inspired while no one feels the benefits from a crisis
averted. Even so, these contrarians, old and new, have promise to do some
good in nudging regulators to better respond to changing risks as financial
markets rapidly evolve.
